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‘Dominion [the investor] came and took over our land with the promise of
compensating us, which they never did. In fact, these people need to get saved
because they are liars’ (focus group discussion in Kenya, 2011 (FGD K5)).
‘Dominion reclaimed the land, they offered employment opportunities, spon-
sored students to go to school (…). They also taught youths some technical
skills to get them into employment, they repaired the roads from Siaya–
Kadenge–Yimbo (…). Dominion also brought electricity from Yimbo to Kadenge
which we never dreamt of. They also improved the facilities in Ratuoro health
centre’ (focus group discussion in Kenya, 2011 (FGD K1)).
‘We are scared out of our minds. Actually very scared (…) because we don’t
have any papers [for the land]’ (focus group discussion in Zambia, 2011 (FGD
Z5)).
These quotes from focus group discussions (FGDs) in Kenya and Zambia illustrate that
large–scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) significantly affect the lives of rural populations
in developing countries. While some participants in these FGDs make reference to
the negative consequences of investors coming in, others praise the benefits they have
brought to local communities. Perceptions about any given project can differ between
individuals and between villages. In light of increased pressure on land, the weaknesses
of land governance systems and poorly defined land rights become evident. This thesis
is a contribution to the growing body of evidence about the nature and effects of LSLAs,
particularly regarding the determinants of the investor’s decision to acquire land, the
processes surrounding the acquisition, and the actors shaping it.
Since the food price crisis of 2008, so–called ‘land grabs’ have dominated many news-
paper articles and raised concerns among politicians in both the receiving and sending
countries of such land investments, civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
as well as the international community at large. The phenomenon of LSLAs is marked
1I wrote this dissertation within the scope of two research projects at the GIGA German Institute
of Global and Area Studies, Institute of African Affairs, under the supervision of Jun.–Prof. Dr. Jann
Lay: from 2010–2013 ‘Large–Scale Land Acquisitions and Sustainable Development’ (funded by the
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF)) and from 2013–2014 ‘Transparency, Dynamics
and Impacts of Large–Scale Land Acquisitions: Global and Local Evidence’ (funded by the Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)).
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1 Introduction
by emotional debates and a conspicuous lack of transparency and data, which makes it
a challenging but highly relevant research topic.
The emotionality of the issue is reflected in the various terms that are used in relation
to it: while the best–known term among the general public, ‘land grabbing’, tends to
be avoided in scientific debates due to its negative connotations, a myriad of more or
less neutral terms also exist. Choosing an appropriate term is no trivial task, as this
decision reflects how one positions oneself in the wider debate. I have chosen to use what
I consider to be the most neutral term, ‘large–scale land acquisition (LSLA)’, throughout
this thesis. I use this term interchangeably with such appellations as land deals, land
investments, land acquisitions or simply land projects.
But what do these terms mean; how can we define LSLAs? In essence, LSLAs are
processes in which land is acquired through either sale, lease or concession. ‘Large–
scale’ signifies areas to be used for commercial purposes and not a given geographical
size. Acquisitions entail a transfer of usage rights, control or ownership of land and usu-
ally induce a change in its use. Often, land is converted from smallholder production,
local community use or an important ecosystem service provision to commercial use
(Land Matrix, 2014). While there are numerous different reasons why investors choose
to acquire land—such as agriculture, mining, tourism or pure speculation—this thesis
concentrates specifically on agricultural land deals. These deals are not only the most
significant group among the acquisition objectives, they are also particularly sensitive
as they target the agricultural sector in poor countries and are thought to have large
effects on receiving countries.
Acquisitions of land as such are not a new phenomenon (Alden Wily, 2012; Peters,
2013; Woodhouse, 2012). Cotula (2013), for instance, identifies three historical waves
of ‘land grabs’ in Africa that influence today’s land governance there. This thesis deals
with the most recent wave of LSLAs, for which the scale and scope of the phenomenon
has changed and wherewith new actors have entered the scene (Cotula, 2013, p. 9;
World Bank, 2010, pp. 50–51).
The introductory chapter proceeds with a literature review, presents the research ques-
tions of this dissertation, and then introduces the research design of the field research
period. Following on, this thesis then features four independent chapters that each
contribute to the literature introduced below. In particular, Chapter 2 conceptualises
LSLAs for agriculture and places them in the context of foreign direct investment (FDI).
It analyses how, against this backdrop, LSLAs are different to FDI in manufacturing.
Chapters 3 and 4 then elucidate the processes surrounding and the actors shaping LSLAs.
Chapter 5 puts specific focus on the consultation of local populations in the process of
acquiring land. The dissertation concludes with a summary of key findings and some
ideas for future research avenues.
1.2 State of the art
In recent years evidence on LSLAs has been growing. While NGOs dominated the debate
in the first years of this phenomenon being studied, academia’s input to that pursuit is
2
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by now substantial. An interdisciplinary research community composed of researchers
from eclectic academic backgrounds—for instance, Anthropology, Development Studies,
Economics, Geography, Legal Studies, Political Sciences, and Sociology—has hitherto
looked at different angles of the phenomenon.
In the following I will review the major strands of this emergent literature that are of
particular importance to this thesis. All of these strands are interconnected.
Extent and nature of large-scale land acquisitions
After the food price crisis of 2008 the media soon picked up on the phenomenon of ‘land
grabbing’ and the notion of it happening on an enormous scale came to dominate the
headlines across the world. However, how many deals have actually been concluded, to
what extent these deals have been implemented and where and by whom they have been
brought into being remains unclear to this day.
Challenges of obtaining data2
The phenomenon of LSLAs is still marked by secrecy and official statistics with regard
to it are virtually non–existent. Many negotiations take place behind closed doors in
contexts of weak land governance systems, and those negotiating the deals often prefer
not to disclose data to the general public. They can have a variety of reasons for this,
ranging from corruption to business confidentiality.
Land acquisitions are, in addition, dynamic in nature which makes it difficult to keep
track of evolving deals: the first time that a deal is mentioned is usually before a contract
is signed. The size that is mentioned then is often inflated as compared to the size that
is later stated in the actual contract. After a deal has been struck, keeping track of its
implementation is extremely difficult as the area actually used for commercial production
can change on a daily basis.
This results in patchy data that is likely to be biased. Most estimates are based
on media sources, as a first point of entry. This leads to a bias in regional coverage:
while relatively democratic countries are more likely to uphold the freedom of the press
with committed journalists, autocratic regimes are less researched into. Some countries,
meanwhile, receive particular international attention due to their global relevance. One
prominent example is China, with its investments having attracted a lot of attention
over the years. Hence the country’s investments have appeared in a vast array of media
sources. Thus, China often ranks first among investor countries—despite numerous deals
having been abandoned long ago and hectare–sizes being exaggerated for many other
deals (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013).
Different estimates on the extent of the phenomenon have been floating around for a
while now, with figures as high as 227 million hectares of land being involved (Oxfam,
2011)—roughly one quarter of the total area of China. While some scholars doubt the
2A good overview of the challenges faced in tracking land deals is provided by Locher and Sulle
(2014) through the example of Tanzania.
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usefulness of a global data base on LSLAs (Edelman, 2013; Oya, 2013), data availability
and quality has improved considerably over the last few years (Cotula, 2013).
The most comprehensive initiative undertaken to systematically collect data is the
Land Matrix Global Observatory, a global and independent project that monitors and
collects data on large–scale land transactions in low– and medium–income countries.
The Land Matrix database records intended, concluded or failed land acquisitions that
have taken place since the year 2000 and covers those involving a geographical area of at
least 200 hectares. These include acquisitions for agricultural and livestock production,
timber extraction, carbon trading, renewable energy production and conservation in
low– and middle–income countries.
Size
In the following, I will use Land Matrix data (as of 1 September 2014) on international
land acquisitions3 to assess the global scale and scope of the phenomenon. While keeping
in mind that this data is likely to be biased, I believe it is still the most accurate estimate
currently available, a view shared by many scholars and international organizations
(Cotula, 2013; Cotula et al., 2014; Messerli et al., 2014; Rulli, Saviori, and D’Odorico,
2013; Schoneveld, 2014; Seaquist, Li Johansson, and Nicholas, 2014).
The Land Matrix reflects the dynamic nature of land acquisitions through two core
variables: first, the ‘negotiation status’ tells us a) whether a deal has resulted in a
concluded contract, b) whether it is intended in cases where an interest has been ex-
pressed but no contract has as yet been concluded, or c) whether the deal has outright
failed. Second, the ‘implementation status’ tells us how far along a project is in terms of
commercial production commencing. These dynamics are also reflected in different size
variables: the intended size is the announced size (such as in a media report) before a
contract is concluded, the contract size is the area given in the contract, and the current
size under production is the area that is currently operational.
Table 1.1 presents the number of land deals with their respective area size according
to their negotiation status. We can take note of a total of 983 concluded deals that
amount to a total land size under contract of 37.3 million hectares, roughly the total
territorial area of Germany. In addition the ‘intended deals’ number 186 cases, with
an intended size of 14.8 million hectares. The huge discrepancy between intended size
and size under contract, for instance 62.3 million hectares of intended and 37.3 million
hectares of size under contract for all concluded deals, can be understood as a sign of
likely future demand for land: we expect that LSLAs will continue to be important in
the future. At the same time, we can expect the size of land that comes under contract
to be much lower than the intended size. The last row shows, that 79 deals have failed,
either during the negotiation stage or in the course of implementation. This figure is
surprisingly low. I assume failed deals are underreported, rather than taking this as a
sign for high success rates of land acquisitions.
3The Land Matrix also includes LSLAs by domestic investors. As foreign investors generally attract
more attention than domestic investors, purely domestic deals are underrepresented. Hence, I chose to
exclude them here. Nonetheless, domestic land acquisitions are assumed to be significant.
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Table 1.1: International land acquisitions according to negotiation status
Number of cases Intended size (inmillion ha)
Size under contract
(in million ha)
Concluded deals 983 62.3 37.3
Intended deals 186 14.8 n.a.
Failed deals 79 7.5 1.9
Source: Land Matrix (2014), data as of 1 September 2014.
Table 1.2 presents the ‘implementation status’, broken down into the different steps
of implementing a project. First of all, we find 265 deals with no information available
on their implementation status. This highlights the difficulties in obtaining such infor-
mation. We can further determine that the majority of deals are currently in operation
(503 deals), while a further 129 deals are in the startup phase. Only for 54 deals has
the project not yet started. We can also take note of the 32 deals that were abandoned
after a contract had been concluded. For those deals currently in operation, the table
not only shows the land size under contract but also the amount under production, 4.1
million hectares. However, as discussed above (see page 3), deals constantly change, so
this latter figure is to be taken with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, looking at older Land
Matrix estimates, it appears that this figure has been increasing steadily over the last
few years—for example, it stood at 1.7 million hectares in June 2013 (Althoff et al.,
2013). Hence, the implementation of deals is ongoing.










Project not started 54 2.8 n.a.
Startup phase (no production) 129 3.2 n.a.
In operation (production) 503 17.0 4.1
Project abandoned 32 1.4 n.a.
No information 265 13.0 n.a.
Total (deals or ha) 983 37.3 4.1
Source: Land Matrix (2014), data as of 1 September 2014.
Investors and target countries
Seaquist, Li Johansson, and Nicholas (2014) use network analysis to scrutinize involved
countries, or as they put it ‘[to] describe the connectivity of the global acquisition sys-
tem’. They find that 126 countries participate in the ‘global land trade’, but that there
are very few countries that account for the majority of such acquisitions. Investors are
5
1 Introduction
concentrated in the Global North and the emerging economies of Asia and the Mid-
dle East, and target countries are confined to the Global South and Eastern Europe.
Anseeuw et al. (2012) come to similar conclusions but put an emphasis on sub–Saharan
Africa as the main target region of land acquisitions. Schoneveld (2014, p. 7) focuses on
land acquisitions in sub–Saharan Africa and concludes that most investments there orig-
inate with traditional investors from industrialized countries. Reflecting these trends,
Table 1.3 shows the most recent Land Matrix ranking of top investor and target coun-
tries.
Table 1.3: Top 10 investor and target countries ranked by size under contract
Rank Investor country Target country
1 USA Papua New Guinea
2 Malaysia Indonesia
3 Singapore South Sudan
4 United Arab Emirates Democratic Republic of the Congo
5 Great Britain Mozambique
6 India Republic of the Congo
7 Saudi Arabia Brazil
8 Netherlands Ukraine
9 Hong Kong Liberia
10 Republic of Korea Sierra Leone
Source: Land Matrix (2014), data as of 1 September 2014.
Another distinguishing feature of land deals is the type of investor (see Table 1.4): most
projects are private companies (428 cases), stock–exchange listed companies (262 cases)
or investment funds (64 cases). Only few projects are semi state–owned (24 cases) or
state–/government–owned companies (44 cases). Oftentimes, investors partner up with
domestic or other international investors. Within the 983 concluded deals, there are 196
cases where more than one investor acquires land jointly.
Table 1.4: International land acquisitions according to type of investor
Number of Deals in 1, 000 ha
Private company 428 16,907
Stock–exchange listed company 262 10,732
Individual entrepreneur 13 252
Investment fund 64 2,526
Semi state–owned company 24 360
State–/ government–owned 44 1,769
Other 5 488
No information 143 4,242
Total (deals or hectares) 983 37,276
Source: Land Matrix (2014), data as of 1 September 2014.
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Messerli et al. (2014) point to the fact that specific local contexts need to be taken
into account when studying LSLAs and link geo–referenced data on land deals with
proxies for the socio–ecological characteristics of the land deal target contexts. Their
results challenge the narrative that assumes land acquisitions target mainly idle land.
In fact, they find that land deals hone in on specific areas within target countries: a)
densely populated and easily accessible croplands; b) moderately accessible and moder-
ately populated shrub– or grassland; and, c) remote and sparsely populated forestland.
These findings support the hypothesis brought forward in many case studies that sug-
gests LSLAs accentuate competition for land resulting in conflicts over it in developing
countries because the areas targeted by investors are by no means idle.
To sum up briefly, obtaining precise data on LSLAs remains a major challenge. Start-
ing with virtually no information, data availability and quality have, fortunately, im-
proved over the last few years. The phenomenon is real, and the extent of it is consider–
able—even though first estimates thereof seem to have been exaggerated. Demand for
agricultural land in low– and middle–income countries is high and is likely to remain so
for the foreseeable future. The biggest challenge academics and policy makers face is to
track the implementation of such projects. The little data that there is suggests that
the implementation is slow—but nevertheless ongoing. Target regions of investments
are located in Eastern Europe and the Global South, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa.
Contrary to popular belief, the land targeted is not idle as close analysis on the local
level shows.
Determinants
The Land Matrix provides some information on the different purposes behind land acqui-
sitions: the majority of deals are targeted at food crop production (335 deals, together
amounting to more than 9.4 million hectares), while agrofuels can be identified as the
second–most important reason for investment involved in 190 deals and covering an area
of almost 8 million hectares. As the Land Matrix focuses on land acquisitions for agri-
culture other sectors are underreported; however, it can identify forestry and tourism as
additional drivers of land acquisitions (see Table 1.5).
The literature on the determinants of land acquisitions identifies factors that determine
an investment decision. These factors can be viewed both in a broad and in a narrow
sense: the broad sense concerns global developments that make acquisitions of land
more attractive. The narrow sense concerns very specific factors that affect an investor’s
decision to acquire land, for instance host country characteristics.
In the broad sense, many authors mention that context conditions set the grounds for
land acquisitions, for example a combination of globalisation, the liberalisation of land
markets, and a worldwide boom in FDI have made sizeable land deals possible (Cotula
et al., 2009; Zoomers, 2010).
The literature further mentions a number of global trends that drive land acquisitions:
First, an increased demand for agricultural products. This demand is itself driven by
7
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Food crops 335 9.4
Livestock 35 0.5
Agrofuels 190 8
Non-food agricultural commodities 132 1.7





No information 45 1.4
Source: Land Matrix (2014), data as of 1 September 2014
population and income growth, and by related changes in consumption patterns (World
Bank, 2010, p. 7). Second, there is an increased demand for agrofuels that has been
triggered by the policies being pursued in key consuming countries (World Bank, 2010,
p. 7; Cotula et al., 2009, p. 5). Agrofuels also raise the profitability of the agricultural
sector and make investments in it more lucrative (Zoomers, 2010). Third, the literature
identifies the importance of the ‘offshoring’ or ‘outsourcing’ of agricultural production.
In light of land– and water–scarcity and food security concerns, investors have cho-
sen to commercially produce in land–abundant regions (hence, where land is typically
cheaper)—where the scope for productivity growth is higher (World Bank, 2010, p. 7;
Zoomers, 2010; Cotula et al., 2009, p. 4). This is true both for investors who produce
for local markets and those who export their produce to locations overseas. Schoneveld
(2014) finds that classical export crops are indeed sent abroad, but staple crops tend to
be marketed locally.
Pinning down these determinants empirically (in the narrow sense) is difficult how-
ever. Arezki, Deininger, and Selod (2013) were among the first scholars to undertake
an empirical study of the determinants of LSLAs. They focus on the push– and pull–
factors that make investors choose a certain destination. Their analysis is based on data
concerning bilateral investment relationships between host and investor countries. The
authors use a gravity framework and test a number of host and investor characteris-
tics as well as bilateral variables. Their findings suggest that the surveyed country’s
agro–ecological potential plays a prominent role in the decision to invest in it. While
the business climate and the yield gap (a measure of agricultural productivity) are in-
significant, weak tenure security is associated with an increased demand for land. They
conclude that interest in land may be rather driven by speculation based on rising land
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prices than by investment projects aimed at actual agricultural production. These find-
ings are challenged by Schoneveld (2014) who claims that the overall situation worldwide
is far too complex for us to make such generalizations. Analysing farmland investments
in sub–Saharan Africa, he calls for analysis that takes into account differences across
both regions and individual investment projects. He finds that most investments are
targeted at classical export cash crops, particularly oilseed cultivation. The core drivers
of this are the agrofuel demand in the European Union and favourable trade conditions
for cash crops. Target countries are seen as attractive due to factors that are difficult to
quantify, such as the historical, cultural, economic and political relations between the
host and home country.
While many studies refer to LSLAs as ‘investments’ or ‘FDI in land’ (Cotula et al.,
2009; Görgen et al., 2009; Wouterse et al., 2011), there has hitherto been no attempt
to clarify the relationship between LSLAs and FDI, and hardly any effort made to draw
on the FDI literature so as to study the determinants of LSLAs (the aforementioned
study by Arezki, Deininger, and Selod (2013) is the exception). This thesis thus seeks
to rectify this shortcoming in Chapter 2.
Processes and actors surrounding and shaping the land acquisition
In the following I elucidate how LSLAs happen and focus on the processes surrounding
the actual land acquisition, as well as on the actors shaping it. As deals are often
negotiated behind closed doors, the process remains a ‘black box’ to outsiders. The
steps an investor has to go through and who negotiates the deals is opaque in many
cases of LSLAs.
Processes of acquiring land take place within complex institutional frameworks. While
the land governance systems are different in every country (Boone, 2014), some similar-
ities across national borders can be identified. For instance, many sub–Saharan African
countries share a similar heritage of a dual land tenure system with therein varying im-
portance of customary land and informal governance mechanisms (German, Schoneveld,
and Mwangi, 2013; Peters, 2013; Platteau, 1996; Toulmin, 2009). This often results in
differences arising between de jure claims and de facto power when it comes to land
administration (Lund and Boone, 2013).
The political economy literature provides explanations for the persistence of such de
facto power (and related institutions)—despite inefficiencies resulting from it (North,
1990, pp. 92–104; Williamson, 2000). For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008)
explain why changes made to de jure political institutions may have no impact on eco-
nomic or policy outcomes: if political institutions change, those in power offset these de
jure changes by making investments in de facto political power.
Case studies provide first empirical insights into the ‘black box’ of land acquisition
processes and provide detailed accounts of involved actors, power relations and the in-
stitutional backdrop. Acquiring land usually involves many different actors, and goes
through many individual stages. While several sub–Saharan African countries have es-
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tablished ‘one–stop–shops’ that facilitate the process for investors,4 on the whole the
process still remains a tedious and complicated one marked by competing land tenure
systems and a lack of checks and balances (Cotula and Vermeulen, 2011; Cotula et al.,
2009). Particularly, the involvement of local people through consultation and compen-
sation is generally weak. Yet, this interaction is a crucial step in any land acquisition,
one that may both increase benefits for local people and their acceptance of a land deal
(Cotula and Vermeulen, 2011).
German, Schoneveld, and Mwangi (2013) provide a detailed comparative analysis of
the processes surrounding land deals based on case study analyses from Ghana, Mozam-
bique, Tanzania and Zambia. They focus on the protection of customary rights in the
context of LSLAs and find that these rights have been lost in all four case study countries
due to deficiencies in the design and enforcement of legal frameworks. These deficiencies
are specifically: the rules governing the size, duration, and permanence of land acquisi-
tions; the identifying of the land and negotiating of access; as well as a lack of proper
consultation, compensation– and monitoring mechanisms.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 (published as Nolte (2014), Nolte and Väth (forthcoming), and
Nolte and Voget-Kleschin (2014)) contribute to the literature on processes and actors
surrounding and shaping LSLAs in being among the first studies to provide insights into
the ‘black box’ of LSLAs.
Welfare implications
Next, I review the literature on the welfare implications5 of LSLAs. Typically, the
occurrence of LSLAs implies a shift towards commercial agriculture.6 They can hence
be considered an external shock that almost certainly has repercussions on (poor) target
countries, and particularly their rural populations.
Collier and Venables (2012) describe this shift in usage as a transition from a ‘land–
abundant, investor–scarce’ to a ‘land–scarce, investor–abundant’ situation. They adopt
a governance perspective and provide an economic framework that analyzes how gov-
ernments can best meet the challenges of sharing the benefits of commercialization for
society at large, and furthermore how they can initiate the transition towards a land–
scarce, investor–abundant situation. The authors argue that currently agricultural pro-
ductivity is extremely low, but that investments potentially increase that productivity.
These investments can partly be provided by the government, but some need to come
from private hands too. In the early stages, ‘pioneer’ investors are attracted by low land
prices that allow them to benefit from future productivity increases on the land bought
(‘option value’). However, rigorous screening and contractual obligations to work the
4Many of these investment promotion agencies have been established in the course of donor–led
liberalization policies (de Schutter, Swinnen, and Wouters, 2013, pp. 122–124).
5I chose to speak about welfare implications which is more precise than the broad term ‘impacts’
that is often used in the literature.
6This does not necessarily result in a conversion of small–scale agriculture to large–scale agriculture.
There is a variety of institutional arrangements such as land rental or contract farming, that retain
small–scale agriculture (World Bank, 2010, pp. 25–27).
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land are indispensable requirements so as to avoid rapacious speculation.
Moving away from these conceptual principles, the actual welfare implications of land
deals fuel the emotional debate on land grabbing like no other strand of the literature
does. On the one hand, concerns over food security in the host countries and the ex-
propriation of smallholders indicate the negative outcomes of LSLAs for the poor: they
may cause low-income farmers to lose their livelihoods either through their outright
displacement or through indirect channels of influence, such as the destruction of lo-
cal markets or rising food and land prices (Cotula and Vermeulen, 2009; FAO, 2009;
Songwe and Deininger, 2009). On the other hand, the agricultural sector is heavily un-
derfinanced (Adesina, 2010) and investments are thus unlikely to be carried out through
official development assistance or by the target countries themselves. As such, private
investments could be a great opportunity for the poor to improve their situation. In
addition, these investments may involve positive spillovers either within the agricultural
sector or through backward and forward linkages to the rest of the national economy.
Even though these effects are heavily debated, we still know very little about them. The
reasons for this are rooted in a number conceptual and methodological challenges that
I will lay out in the following.
First, many studies set out to analyze the welfare implications of LSLAs without
further specification. It is important to be precise, and thus to ask who is affected
by LSLAs—as their welfare implications can have an effect on the local, the national,
and/or the global level (FAO, 2013, pp. 323–331), and can work differently across
different groups of stakeholders. For instance Väth (2013), based on a case study in
Ghana, points to the fact that outcomes turn out very differently across different social
groups: neighbouring villages realize mixed outcomes linked to land loss, infrastructure
improvements and employment creation; communities further afield are rather negatively
affected by the investment as they are too far away from it to experience any positive
spillovers; outgrowers, meanwhile, are identified as the real winners from the investment.
Second, we need to identify the transmission channels through which welfare implica-
tions take effect. While the empirical literature on FDI (specifically in manufacturing)
considers spillovers to be one of the main transmission channels of FDI on domestic
firms (Javorcik, 2004), there is little evidence on transmission channels of land deals.
The proof that currently exists stems exclusively from case studies. For instance, the
World Bank (2010, pp. 45–50) formulates hypotheses on transmission channels derived
from 19 case studies on individual projects in seven countries. They find that invest-
ments can affect local livelihoods and food security by generating jobs, providing social
services, increasing knowledge and improving the asset base of local populations through
the financial compensation awarded. A good overview of the transmission channels is
provided by Kleemann and Thiele (2014), who develop a theoretical model on welfare im-
plications that bases its assumptions on the available case study evidence. They analyze
the different transmission channels of LSLAs that affect rural populations. In particu-
lar, they take displacements and compensation, employment effects, spillover effects and
changes in food prices into account. They posit that in a staple food crop scenario wel-
fare implications are likely to be negative, due to falling wage and rising food prices. For
labour intensive crops, the chances for positive welfare implications occurring are higher
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if spillover effects materialize—for instance through contract farming schemes. They
conclude that so far hardly any evidence exists either way, and as such more empirical
studies are needed to investigate welfare implications and productivity effects.
Third, we need to clarify which exact time horizon we have in mind: Do we consider
medium– or long–term impacts, or do we look only at the immediate impacts of the
land acquisition—for instance in the form of compensation or displacement? Making
this distinction is crucial, as welfare implications differ according to the maturity of
a project. For instance infrastructure is usually constructed in the implementation
stage of a project, during which time many jobs accrue; an operational, mature project,
meanwhile, typically provides less employment opportunities. Most studies touching
upon welfare implications are based on case studies and furthermore only consider the
short–term perspective , for instance FAO (2013) and Schoneveld, German, and Nutakor
(2011).
In the literature, a balanced assessment of the welfare implications of investment
projects from a medium– to long–term perspective is missing because such an approach
throws up many methodological challenges. Medium– to long–term welfare implications
can only be assessed after several years of project’s operation. With a large number of
rather young projects currently being found around the globe, protracted welfare impli-
cations have simply not yet materialized. Moreover, it is hard to find a counterfactual
case to compare the developments in the project area in question with, in other words
a comparable area that has not been affected by a LSLA.
Hence, there have hitherto been few attempts to assess long–term welfare implications
of LSLAs. One exception is Mujenja and Wonani (2012), who analyse two Zambian
investment projects dating back to the 1970s and 1980s—hence, ventures set up in a very
different context as compared to that of today—and find positive outcomes therefrom
due to job creation and increased household incomes.
Moreover, hardly any quantitative assessments of welfare implications exists. One
exception—however, also based only on a single case study—is a study by Väth and
Kirk (2014). They use a quasi–natural experiment and compare outgrower farmers to
independent oil palm growers in the vicinity of a large–scale oil palm investment project
in Ghana. They find that LSLAs may be beneficial for those who participate in contract
farming. Moreover, Väth, Gobien, and Kirk (2014) find that contract farming increases
the subjective well–being of outgrowers.
So far, no cross–country quantitative assessment—meaning one not based on a case
study—has been undertaken. Hence, as of now, assessments on welfare implications
remain tied to specific case studies, and thus general conclusions cannot be drawn at
present.
This thesis contributes to the literature on welfare implications in Chapters 3 and 4 in
that it contributes to the transmission channels thereof. It provides preliminary ideas




Above, I identified the numerous gaps in the literature that this dissertation seeks to
address. First, there is a lack of conceptually understanding of the relationship between
FDI and LSLAs, as well as the similarity of or difference in their determinants. Moreover,
so far there have been only a few studies that have empirically tested the determinants
of LSLAs (in the narrow sense). Hence, Chapter 2 asks:
What is the relationship between LSLAs for agriculture and FDI?
To what degree are the determinants driving LSLAs similar or different to
those of FDI?
To address these questions, Chapter 2 employs a cross–country analysis based on a
gravity model.
Second, there is currently only a very limited understanding of the processes surround-
ing and the actors shaping land acquisitions. This holds true in particular for consulta-
tions with local communities. Moreover, as things stand we do not know much about
the welfare implications of LSLAs in agriculture nor the latter’s transmission channels.
These gaps are addressed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, based on case studies conducted in
Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Zambia.
More specifically, Chapter 3 concentrates on the implementation of LSLAs in Ghana
and Kenya and asks:
How are land deals implemented (in Ghana and in Kenya)?
Chapter 4 similarly focuses on the implementation of LSLAs within the Zambian land
governance system and looks into the role different actors play. The chapter asks:
How are land deals implemented within the Zambian land governance system?
How does land change hands, who is involved in these negotiations and what
roles do different actors play herein?
How are local land users affected by LSLAs?
Chapter 5 concentrates on consultations of local communities, and asks:
How are local communities involved in the process of LSLAs?
How can consultations be evaluated?
How do voluntary guidelines and private governance instruments compare to
de jure and de facto consultation in Mali?
To study LSLAs in–depth, this dissertation combines qualitative and quantitative
empirical research methods. The various chapters of this dissertation each use different
research methods and draw on alternate data sources. This combination of methods is
required to do justice to the complex phenomenon of LSLAs but is quite unique and
hence a singularity of this dissertation.
13
1 Introduction
1.4 Research design of field research
In the following, I present and discuss the primary data (which provides the foundations
for Chapters 3, 4 and 5) that I gathered during the field research. Chapter 2 uses data
from the Land Matrix Global Observatory and the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) which is described in detail in section 2.3 of the chapter.
I conducted field research in two stages: first, I undertook a scoping trip, and second, I
collected data. The aim of the scoping trip (conducted from October to December 2010,
with about two weeks spent in each of the four countries) was to verify that the chosen
countries were suitable for such field research and to prepare for the second stage, data
collection. This included identifying several cases of land investment for the follow–up
study. The aim of the second stage, the actual data collection, was to research the
processes happening on the ground. Research was conducted about six weeks in each
country: between February and March 2011 in Zambia, between September and October
2011 in Kenya, and between October and November 2011 in Mali. At the same time,
data was collected in Ghana by one of my co–authors, Susanne Väth (October and
November 2011).
Case selection
I use an embedded case study research design (Yin, 2002, pp. 42–46): As a first unit
of analysis, I studied countries in which land investments took place. Within the case
study countries, I looked at single investment cases. However, the level of detail in
which I studied these is not consistent across the different chapters due to the variations
in study settings; for example in Ghana and Kenya access to the investment cases was
sufficiently good to allow a detailed case study, while this was not possible in Mali and
Zambia.
First of all, I selected case study countries only from within sub–Saharan Africa. This
region is (and has been) considered the main target of LSLAs (Land Matrix, 2014).
When I first started this thesis, virtually no data was available on the scale and scope of
the phenomenon. Hence, as part of the pre–selection of cases, I researched countries for
which reports on land acquisitions were available, sourced through the NGO GRAIN’s
webpage at http://farmlandgrab.org which publishes news reports on land acquisi-
tions. For the actual selection, I aimed at obtaining insights into LSLAs from different
countries, particularly on the processes surrounding those deals and on the actors shap-
ing them. Thus, I chose countries in different regions of Africa: Ghana and Mali in West
Africa, Kenya in East Africa, and Zambia in Southern Africa.7
Second, the selection of investment cases (see Table 1.6) within the case study countries
7Please note that I did not adhere in the selection process to such concepts as the most different or
most similar design (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). I elected instead for different stand–alone country
case studies. I only conduct a direct comparison in the case of Ghana and Kenya (see Chapter 3).
In looking at all these individual studies across different regional settings, common patterns on the
processes surrounding and actors involved in land deals emerge. I hence provide such a generalized set
of findings in Chapter 6.
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was based on the available research opportunities in each respective country: in Ghana
and Kenya, I decided to concentrate on one investment project with importance in
the region, whereas in Mali I chose to concentrate on investments within the most
sought–after investment region. In Zambia, in turn, I visited three different investments
projects in three different regions to get an overall understanding of the phenomenon.
Table 1.6: Investment cases in case study countries
Investment project Region Country
Ghana Oil Palm Development Kwaebibirem District Ghana
Dominion Farms Bondo and Siaya District Kenya
N–Sukala Office du Niger Mali
Malibya Office du Niger Mali
Sosumar Office du Niger Mali
Amajuba Farms Mkushi Zambia
Johnken Estates Chisamba Zambia
China–Zambia–Friendship Farm Lusaka West Zambia
Obviously, the sampling of these investment cases is not representative of the whole
population of investment projects, as I did not have a complete population to choose
from. Furthermore, due to the sensitive nature of the topic being investigated, the
possibility to undertake research was dependent on the accessibility of these projects—
however, the sampling was never meant to be representative. Rather, these cases serve
as an in–depth illustration of actual processes and as a starting point to generate testable
hypotheses. Only in the cases of Ghana and Kenya, did I study individual investment
projects in close detail. These can be considered crucial ‘pathway cases’ from which to
elucidate core causal mechanisms (Gerring, 2007).
Data sources
In order to capture both the de jure and the de facto situation I used different data
sources: I set out to collect as many legal documents, reports and other forms of written
evidence on the laws concerning land tenure as possible. To complement those de jure
documents with information on the de facto situation, I also collected some primary
data (see Table 1.7).
Table 1.7: Primary data sources







Concerning the primary data, I first conducted semi–standardized interviews9 to gather
more information on both the de facto and de jure situation. I held these interviews in
the respective capital cities (as land governance is highly centralized in these countries),
as well as in the vicinity of certain investment projects.
As a sampling strategy I used the following approach: From my scoping trip, I had a
clear idea of the different stakeholders involved in land acquisitions (such as governmen-
tal actors on the national and local levels and civil society). From each of these groups
I contacted several relevant stakeholders, and they then referred me to other intervie-
wees (‘snowball sampling’)(Berg, 2007, p. 33). I prepared the interview guidelines that I
would use as a basis for the interviews10. All interviews started with a narrative question
(‘Could you tell me how you are involved with large–scale land acquisitions?’11), and
would then touch upon important steps in the land acquisition process. These guide-
lines were adjusted to different stakeholders (for example a judge would need to be asked
different questions to someone from civil society). During the research process they were
continuously altered as I learnt about relevant aspects that I had previously not taken
into account. I initially set out to record interviews, however, I soon realized that this
was not feasible. The research topic is quite a delicate one, and especially politicians
did not want to be recorded. Some interviewees even asked me not to take any notes.
Accordingly, my data for interviews is protocols.12
Second, I conducted FGDs in selected investment regions.13 The FGDs provide in-
sights into what happens on the ground de facto (as opposed to what is stipulated in
the laws) and into what perceptions local land users have. FGDs are particularly useful
to investigate phenomenoa that have not been studied, very well. They have certain ad-
vantages that make them a great complement to the other data sources that I use: First,
in contrast to interviews FGDs allow interaction between participants and can thereby
elucidate group opinions, offer contextual insights and trigger spontaneous responses.
Second, from a practical standpoint, they are an efficient way of collecting data from a
large number of individuals (Bloor, 2001, p. 17; Berg, 2007, pp. 116–117).
I conducted all FGDs together with a local team that spoke the relevant local language.
I trained two people to moderate such discussions. During these, one of them would
moderate and the other would take notes and operate a voice recorder.14 I remained
discreetly present in the background. The groups were meant to be equal in terms of
8All data from Ghana was collected by Susanne Väth.
9For a detailed overview on semi–standardized interviews, please refer to Berg (2007, pp. 70–110).
10In Zambia, a project colleague, Setareh Stephan, joined me for two weeks. She was present during
most of the interviews. In Kenya, I conducted the whole field research with my co–author, Susanne
Väth. She was present during (almost) all interviews and focus group discussions.
11Prior to this question I defined what I understood by ‘large–scale land acquisition’ so that inter-
viewees and I were referring to the same concept.
12I took notes during the interview and then typed them the same day. In Kenya and Zambia most
interviews were done in a team of two, with one person doing the interview and the other taking notes.
In Mali, I was doing interviews and taking notes at the same time.
13For a more detailed overview on FGDs, please refer to (Bloor, 2001; Berg, 2007, pp. 111–132).
14I always asked for consent before starting the recording and assured participants that I would keep
their identity secret. Except one case, the groups never opposeed the recording.
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hierarchy. In rural Africa, it is inevitable that people know each other so I decided to use
‘pre–existing groups’ (such as village communities, cooperatives) that also facilitated the
assembling of groups (Bloor, 2001, pp. 22–24). As to the sampling of participants, I had
to take into account the fact that each country has different social hierarchies. Generally
speaking, my research team and I approached some form of higher level of authority
who then in turn referred us to village authorities. The latter would then assemble the
participants. For instance, in Kenya and Zambia we approached agricultural extension
officers. In Mali we approached mayors with a letter of recommendation who then signed
this letter and sent us to village elders.
In each investment region we intended (and managed most times) to hold discussions
with groups of different wealth levels (such as landless farmers/poorer people versus
smallholders who own their own plots of land/medium income individuals versus richer
people),15 and with employees of investment projects with different qualifications (per-
manent versus casual employees).16 Each group set out to have between seven and 15
participants, both men and women. The FGDs started with a narrative question (‘We
would ask you to discuss how wellbeing17 in your community has developed during the
last 30 years’.) which was designed to reveal how the communities themselves perceive
the investment projects and to obtain some initial unbiased thoughts on the projects.
Only after this entry discussion did the moderator ask specific questions on how the
investors had announced themselves and entered the country. At the end, I asked the
participants what they considered to be the main impacts of the investment on their
lives, after which they had to rate (positive, neutral, negative) some specific impact op-
tions the moderator provided them with. The data for FGDs is transcriptions in English
and French (translated from the respective local languages by one of the moderators).
Examples of guidelines for expert interviews (see page 69) and FGDs (see page 71) as
well as the transcription rules (see page 75) can be found in the Appendix.
Analysis
The data feeds the papers presented in Chapters 4, 3 and 5 in two ways: a) as an
additional source of information (particularly on de facto processes), and b) as anecdotal
evidence that helps to deepen my narrative. I use the software MaxQDA for content
analysis (Berg, 2007, pp. 238–267). This means in particular: First, I went through all
texts and used an open coding scheme. Put differently, I looked for common patterns
in the data. These evolving codes were very broad in the beginning and were narrowed
down over time. For instance, one code was ‘the process of acquiring land’ with the
15This varied in the different countries. For instance, in Zambia, it was rather easy to distinguish
between landless farmers and smallholders, in Kenya, there were no ‘landless’ farmers but people had
no difficulty in self–selecting themselves into different groups according to their wealth level.
16Each of the Chapter 2, 3, and 5 includes a section ‘additional material’ that lists all FGDs conducted
in the respective country.
17The discussion on well–being was illustrated with a timeline that was drawn on a blackboard for
every participant to see. The moderator marked important events the group mentioned. The higher
the moderator placed the event on the blackboard, the more this event was linked to an increase in
well–being. Please refer to the Appendix, Page 72 for a sketch.
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subcodes ‘consultation’, ‘contracts’, ‘actors’, ‘leases’, ‘displacements’ and so on. ‘Actors’,
of course, would have again subcodes.
Second, based on these codes, I organized the data. For instance, I identified the steps
that are important in the process of land acquisition. Through this procedure, I found
very different foci emerge in the analyses of the three chapters—for example, the Malian
data was particularly revealing on aspects of consultation.
In the last step, I interpreted—or put differently, made sense of—the data. For in-
stance, to analyze the role of chiefs in the acquisition process, I would then look at the
different descriptions given in the text passages that I had marked with the code ‘chief’.
I looked at who said what in which context (interview or FGD), and then see if these
statements were consistent or contradictory. For instance, if several interviewees stated
the same facts I had greater confidence in the data. If statements contradicted each
other, I rather doubted the data’s reliability.
Potential biases
Case selection, sampling, data collection and analysis introduce some potential biases
that I briefly want to comment on.
First, the countries and investment projects chosen might be very distinctive ones.
Since I am not using a formal comparison design here, this is not a great problem as
long as I keep in mind that my findings are potentially restricted to these cases alone
and if so that they cannot be generalized.
Second, the sampling of interviewees and focus group participants can introduce bi-
ases. My findings depend to a large extent on who it was that I interviewed. This
is particularly problematic for the FGDs with project employees, as the groups were
assembled by the investors themselves. Their employees might have painted a rather
rosy picture of circumstances on the ground so as not to upset their boss. However I
held FGDs with different groups and undertook many individual interviews, and hence
believe that these choices led to a rather balanced sampling. Most core findings are con-
sistent across different FGDs and interviews. Moreover, I assured all interviewees that
their data would be kept confidential and hence believe that most people were telling
their story straight.
Third, the data collection process itself can also introduce biases. The role of the in-
terviewer (or moderator), the interaction between interviewee and interviewer (or group
and moderator) and the way in which the interviewer (or moderator) poses questions
have important implications for the data that is obtained (Berg, 2007, p. 84). For in-
stance, a government official in the capital might be surprised to find that the researcher
is young and female, and may thus rather tell funny stories than earnestly answer ques-
tions. In other cases, respondents might try to please the interviewer and tell her what
they think she wants to hear. In my case this might have been aggravated by the fact
that I was obviously foreign to the different study regions (Desai and Potter, 2006, pp.
34–43). For instance, the presence of a white person in an African rural area often
raises hopes of aid money being received. Hence, respondents might strategically tell me
about the negative impacts of investment projects in hope of receiving more aid. This
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is a common problem in qualitative research, which I try to address as best as possible
(which is why, for example, I stayed at the back during FGDs).
Fourth, the data analysis process may have biased my findings, as interpreting text
involves a number of pitfalls: For instance, it is important to see text passages in the
context of the interview or discussion from which they are derived. Otherwise, one
risks overrating an aspect that is later devalued or even stating the opposite of what
a participant actually originally meant. Moreover, the questions of how much weight
should be given to individual claims and how to handle contradictory ones are difficult to
answer—the researchers can introduce biases if they inadvertently overvalue individual
claims and play down any contradictions (Berg, 2007, pp. 258–259).
I certainly cannot deny that all these potential biases still exist here, despite having
kept them in mind throughout the study process. These biases thus have to be considered
when reflecting on the general overall patterns and results identified in this thesis.
Additional Material
Focus group discussions
K1, Youth group, Kadenge, 22.09.2011.
K5, Rich farmers, Kadenge, 27.09.2011.
Z5, Smallholder farmers, Nyama, 26.03.2011.
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2 The relationship between foreign
large-scale land acquisitions in
developing countries and agricultural
foreign direct investment
Kerstin Nolte & Jann Lay
Abstract1
This paper conceptualizes large–scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) and puts them in the
context of foreign direct investment (FDI). We scrutinize from a theoretical point of
view whether the determinants of such land–based agricultural investments are differ-
ent from those of FDI in the manufacturing sector. We then empirically examine these
determinants using data from the Land Matrix Global Observatory and United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). We find that LSLAs are a spe-
cific but important subset of FDI. Our findings suggest that resource–seeking objectives
and institutions play an important role in land–based agricultural investments, while
market–seeking objectives are negligible. However, the data at hand is insufficient to
draw robust conclusions from the empirical analysis. Our major contribution thus lies
in the conceptual ideas.
2.1 Introduction
The increasing global interest in agricultural land has attracted considerable attention
in recent years. Yet little focus has been put on conceptually understanding how large–
scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) for agriculture fit within the global context of foreign
direct investment (FDI). Evidence on the drivers and implications of the phenomenon is
still scarce, and the findings are so far inconclusive. Some broad patterns in international
1We wish to thank the participants of seminars at the Institute of the World Economy Kiel and the
University of Göttingen, as well as the attendees of the CSAE conference in Oxford (2014) and the
IAMO Forum in Halle (2014). We further thank our colleagues from the Land Matrix Global Obser-
vatory Partnership for their constructive and close cooperation over the years. We are grateful to have
received funding from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) within
the project ’Transparency, dynamics and impacts of large–scale land acquisitions (LSLAs): Global and
local evidence’.
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LSLAs for agriculture have been revealed by the analysis of the actors involved in these
transactions. Seaquist, Li Johansson, and Nicholas (2014) find that most countries par-
ticipate in the ‘global land trade’ but that only a few countries account for the majority
of acquisitions. Investors are from the Global North and the emerging economies of
Asia and the Middle East—typically countries with relatively little cultivable land and
with high–tech agricultural sectors—while target countries are located in the Global
South and Eastern Europe—countries that are relatively well endowed with cultivable
land but have low agricultural productivity. These observations lend support to the hy-
pothesis that some sort of ‘agricultural outsourcing’ to resource–rich but low–production
countries may be at work.
Empirical results on the determinants of FDI rely almost exclusively on data on foreign
investments in industry and services. FDI in natural resource sectors or agriculture, how-
ever, is rarely studied (a few exceptions are Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2013), Asiedu
and Lien (2011), and Hajzler (2014)). To the best of our knowledge, hardly any previ-
ous empirical studies have looked at FDI in agricultural land. An exception is the study
by Arezki, Deininger, and Selod (2013), that analyses the determinants of land–based
investments using a gravity framework. The study confirms the prominent role of the
agro–ecological potential of target countries. Also, while the impact of the business
climate is negligible, weak tenure security is associated with increased demand for land.
The authors conclude that the insignificance of the yield gap and the importance of weak
land governance suggest that interest in land may be driven more by speculation about
rising land prices than by actual investment projects aiming to undertake agricultural
production.
Hence, there are good reasons to hypothesize that the importance of some determi-
nants may be different for FDI in agriculture. LSLAs can be viewed as an indication of a
new trend in FDI—targeted at the agricultural sectors in developing countries—as well
as a transformation of global agriculture towards commercial investments. While agri-
culture is declining in importance in terms of its contribution to the global value added,
it is still the main livelihood for the world’s poor. In principle, land–based agricultural
investment may contribute to higher agricultural productivity in receiving countries
and possibly involve positive spillovers, either within the agricultural sector or through
backward and forward linkages to the rest of the economy. Conceptualizing land–based
agricultural investment, understanding its determinants, and examining whether they
resemble those of FDI in manufacturing hence generates interesting insights from both
an international and a development economics perspective. This paper has two foci:
First, it conceptualizes LSLAs for agriculture and puts them in the context of FDI.
From a theoretical point of view, we analyse whether the determinants of LSLAs for
agriculture are different from those of FDI. Second, using data from the Land Matrix
Global Observatory and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD), we expand on the analysis of Arezki, Deininger, and Selod (2013) and empirically
examine the determinants of land–based agricultural investment.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2.2 assesses the relationship
between LSLAs for agriculture and FDI; section 2.3 presents the research design; section
2.4 provides econometric results; and section 2.5 discusses the findings and concludes
the paper.
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2.2 LSLAs for agriculture and FDI
2.2.1 Conceptual clarification
Foreign land–based agricultural investments can be described as purchases or leases of
land for the production of agricultural commodities. The Organisation for Economic
Co–operation and Development (OECD) defines FDI, in turn, as an investment project
in which a direct investor has interest in an enterprise that is resident in an economy
other than that of the direct investor. Moreover, the objective of FDI is to establish a
lasting interest that involves a long–term relationship between investor and enterprise
and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise (OECD, 2009,
p. 48).
To scrutinize whether the OECD definition applies to LSLAs for agriculture, we exam-
ine the available data. Generally speaking, FDI has been on the rise in those countries
that are targets of LSLAs, especially since approximately 2004, and the primary sector
has played a major role in this rise (UNCTAD, 2014). However, official FDI statistics
are not usually broken down by sector (FAO, 2013);2 we hence use data from the Land
Matrix Global Observatory as of 1 September 2014. Because the total number of LSLAs
is not known, the Land Matrix can be considered to be a sample of LSLAs. It records
transactions that entail a transfer of rights to use, control or own land through sale,
lease or concession; that cover 200 hectares or more; that are targeted at low– and
middle–income countries; and that have been concluded since the year 2000. The Land
Matrix data is inherently biased, and most of these biases are introduced by the use of
media reports as a source. This results in certain regions, investors, or sectors being
overrepresented while others are neglected.
In line with our study focus and in order to remove some biases, this study uses a
subset of the whole Land Matrix database. We limit our sample to agricultural deals
involving at least one foreign investor. This sample includes a total of 744 deals, of which
570 investments have only one investor and 150 cases have multiple investors (131 with
two and 19 with three).3
The largest share of investors is made up of private companies (300), followed by
stock–exchange listed companies (220), state– and government–owned companies (39),
investment funds (42), semi–state–owned companies (24), and individual entrepreneurs
(9). The majority of cases operate on leased land (365 of the 472 for which we have
this information); the remaining cases are outright purchases. The duration of the lease
contracts varies: Of 178 reported cases, 163 are for 25 years or longer. Forty are for 50
2UNCTADStat has data on inward and outward flows of FDI but this data is not broken down by
sector. Data from the OECD has inflows and outflows broken down by sector but only covers OECD
countries. Especially for outward flows, data is missing for reasons of ‘confidentiality’ or ‘secondary
confidentiality’. Most promising is the data from the International Trade Centre, which provides global
FDI data broken down by sector for inward and outward flows for the years 2009 to 2012 (though
2012 is extremely patchy). However, closer investigation shows that the data is too patchy to identify
any trends.
3There are always cases that miss pieces of information. For example, here 24 cases have no infor-
mation on the number of investors involved in the project.
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years, 41 for 70 years, and 17 for 99 years. The OECD further distinguishes between four
different types of investment: purchase/sale of existing equity in the form of mergers and
acquisitions, greenfield investments, extension of capital (additional new investments),
and financial restructuring (OECD, 2009, p. 87). Examining who formerly owned the
land can provide a suggestion as to the type of investment. Most of the land was formerly
owned by the state (90), followed by private owners (smallholders or large–scale farms,
77 cases), and communities (34).
We can conclude that LSLAs for agriculture conform to the OECD definition given
above because (a) a direct investor—be it a private company, a stock–exchange listed
company or an investment fund—has interest in an enterprise abroad. Moreover, (b)
the duration of the contracts is long–lasting which suggests a long–term relationship.
A look at the former owners indicates that the majority of LSLA cases are greenfield
investments (land not formerly used for commercial agriculture) but that we also have
a few mergers and acquisitions. Thus, we hold that LSLAs are a specific form of FDI
or, more precisely, a subset of agricultural FDI.
To make one qualification, we cannot exclude speculation in our sample. Despite a
signed contract, concluded deals may not yet have gone into production.4 In these cases,
land may have been leased or purchased merely as an asset in the expectation of rising
land prices—that is, for speculative reasons—and speculative land acquisitions do not
qualify as FDI.
2.2.2 Theory
From a theoretical stance, FDI flows are determined by two major decisions firms take:
first, profit–maximizing multinational firms seek low–cost production locations, and sec-
ond, these firms assess whether it is worthwhile to internalize production abroad through
FDI or whether it makes sense to trade with a foreign producer (Dunning, 1998, 2009).
While the locational choice has been stressed in the traditional literature, the inter-
nalization aspect has gained attention in the more recent literature. The decision to
internalize is driven by a variety of factors.
First, in light of new developments in the world economy, the literature on FDI has
put the organizational choice of individual firms at the forefront (Helpman, 2006). This
choice depends to a large extent on firm–specific factors, such as productivity and intan-
gible assets (for example, technologies, managerial skills, brands, etc.), and can hence
only be tested empirically based on firm–level data.
4Land deals are dynamic in nature and are constantly changing. The Land Matrix uses two variables
to describe the status of a deal: the negotiation status and the implementation status. The negotiation
status includes ‘intended’, ‘concluded’ and ‘failed’ deals, and we only use concluded deals. The imple-
mentation status further distinguishes between ‘project not started’, ‘start–up phase (no production)’,
‘in operation (production)’ and ‘project abandoned’. It is important to understand that it is very diffi-
cult to follow the implementation of a project. In our sample, a large share of deals have started the
project: 418 out of 716 deals (77 in ‘start–up phase’ and 341 ‘in operation’). For a further 222 cases
there is no information on the implementation status. It is not clear whether these cases are speculation
or whether they are already producing.
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Second, the governance of international transactions plays an important role. In-
complete contracts—for example, with regard to the protection of intellectual property
rights—can be overcome by internalizing market transactions (Antràs, 2005).
Third, trade barriers influence the decision to enter a foreign market through FDI.
While trade barriers in manufacturing have been reduced to a minimum under agree-
ments such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), trade restrictions
remain commonplace in agriculture (Dennis and Iscan, 2011; Josling et al., 2010).
Fourth, market failures may explain why firms decide to set up a subsidiary through
FDI: For instance, input and factor markets in the rural areas of poor target countries are
highly imperfect. Capital markets are underdeveloped, the supply of technical inputs like
fertilizer is limited, and even labour markets are sometimes hardly existent (Josling et
al., 2010; Sexton, 1990). This explains the lack of target–country suppliers who could, in
theory, be contracted and licensed to export the desired product. Investors can overcome
these input and factor imperfections. However, trade or FDI in such contexts involves
high transportation and initial investment costs—for example, for roads and irrigation
(Dethier and Effenberger, 2012; Dorward et al., 2004). Where states fail to provide
basic infrastructure, these costs have to be borne fully by the investor. This implies
that investors wish to secure the returns on these investments, which, in turn, partly
explains why production is internalized (Collier and Venables, 2012).
Finally, institutions and policies have been stressed as important determinants of a
firm’s decision to internalize. For instance, Busse and Hefeker (2007) analyse the link-
ages between political risk, institutions, and FDI inflows in developing countries. Their
cross–country data confirms the importance of political risk and institutional indicators
for investment decisions. Similarly, Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998) study
the effect of host–country policies on FDI flows for 49 less–developed countries. Pooled
cross–section and time–series data reveals that institutional characteristics have signifi-
cant effects on FDI. In particular, the authors identify detrimental effects resulting from
corruption and the negative linear influence of corporate tax rates. Wei (2000) also
identifies negative effects of corruption and taxes on FDI. More recently, the notion of
‘institutional distance’ has gained in importance. The idea is that investors who are used
to poor institutional settings are also more likely to invest in these places. Thus, it is
not only the institutions in host countries that affect FDI, but also the respective differ-
ences and similarities between institutions in the host and investor countries (Abdioglu,
Khurshed, and Stathopoulos, 2013; Aleksynska and Havrylchyk, 2013; Bénassy-Quéré,
Coupet, and Mayer, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006).
These theoretical arguments have typically been developed with an implicit focus on
manufacturing, but they apply to other industries, in principle, as well. However, the
weight of certain (groups of) determinants may well differ between manufacturing and
agricultural FDI. In the following, we thus present four reasons why we believe that FDI
in agriculture may be driven by different determinants.
First, investments in land and agriculture are related to the politically sensitive areas
of food and energy supply. Governments all over the world are concerned about food
prices and food supplies, particularly in poorer countries (Cotula et al., 2009). The
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increasing use of agricultural produce for the production of energy is adding to these
concerns (Dauvergne and Neville, 2009). Governments may hence strategically secure
access to resources for agricultural production, either directly or by supporting the for-
eign operations of domestic firms. In the context of foreign land investment, it is not
uncommon to find state–owned investors, particularly from the Middle East. In addi-
tion, in the target country the state typically ‘owns’ the land that is being bought or
leased by the investor (Cotula et al., 2009). Ultimately, if the strategic considerations of
ensuring food and energy supplies in investor countries are the main motivation of FDI,
market–seeking objectives should be less important.
Second, land and water are very specific production inputs. While some production
factors, in particular labour with specific skills and capital, are mobile, this is not the
case for (some) natural resources. In addition, land and water can hardly be substi-
tuted in most agricultural production. Demand for agricultural products is growing
due to rapid population growth, increasing incomes, and environmental factors such as
land degradation and desertification (Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011; World Bank, 2010;
Zoomers, 2010). Accordingly, land (and water) resources are increasingly being put un-
der pressure on a global scale. In sum, the immobility and non–substitutability of land
and water resources and their growing scarcity leads us to assume that for agricultural
FDI the choice of production location is largely driven by resource–seeking factors.
Third, low land prices are likely to attract FDI (Collier and Venables, 2012). The
(relative) abundance of the immobile factor land in certain countries and input market
failures (particularly frequent in rural areas in developing countries) imply that land
productivity and hence land prices are low. Land productivity is indeed much lower
in large areas of sub–Saharan Africa (Adesina, 2010) and may be a pull–factor for in-
vestors who expect high returns on their investment by increasing the productivity of
the acquired land. In many instances, however, investors acquire land that is not yet
under agricultural production, particularly forests and shrub– and grasslands (Messerli
et al., 2014). Here, low prices may partly fail to reflect either the value generated from
communal uses or ecological functions that are not internalized by proper institutions.
In fact, institutional failure, specifically the lack of marketable land rights, allows gov-
ernments to use their legal authority to assign ‘underutilized’ land to investors for low
prices. Low prices for land also give rise to speculation (Collier and Venables, 2012).
Fourth, the importance of institutions and policies, as discussed above, certainly also
holds for agricultural FDI, but some peculiarities are noteworthy. Acquisitions of land
take place within a highly complicated land–administration system and a politicized en-
vironment (Boone, 2014). The distinguishing characteristic of agricultural investments
vis–à–vis non–agricultural investments is that the former involve the acquisition of land
as a key input factor—typically through a long–term lease contract. While the acqui-
sition of capital (or greenfield investment activities) on the part of foreign investors is
usually subject to an important array of formal rules and requirements, the acquisition
of land (especially in low– and middle–income countries) takes place under land gover-
nance systems characterized by land use rights that are often vaguely defined through
overlapping formal and informal rules (Lund, 2006). Investors may hence be tempted to
take advantage of ambiguous rules and, for example, acquire land for prices well below
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the market value. We also expect institutional distance to play a role. For instance,
investors from countries with well–functioning institutions and an open press may be
more likely to respond to public pressure and opinion (or anticipate this opinion and
behave differently in the first place). Firms from such places may also be more likely
to submit themselves to investment principles and guidelines. Investors from corrupt
countries are more likely to invest in corrupt target countries.
These four departures from the determinants of FDI in manufacturing do not imply
that agricultural FDI is entirely different. We expect factors that influence trade and
information costs to matter equally for agricultural FDI, specifically geographical dis-
tance, common official language, and former colonial relationship. However, we also
expect some differences—for example, that resource–seeking factors play a more pro-
nounced role while market–seeking factors are less important. We assume that target
countries with inefficient agricultural production are likely to be targeted, and that insti-




In our empirical analysis of the determinants of LSLAs for agriculture uses, we use Land
Matrix data to construct our dependent variable. To describe our data set, we introduce
some simple notation. Let 𝑦𝑖𝑗 be the sum (in hectares) of all land acquired by investors
from country j (hereafter referred to as investor country) in country i (hereafter target
or host country) with 𝑖 = {1, .., 𝑃} where 𝑃 is the number of low– and middle–income
countries in the world. Then, all land acquired in country i, 𝑌𝑖, will be the sum of land
acquired by investors from all countries of the world 𝑗 = {1, .., 𝐶} with 𝐶 being the
number of countries in the world. We only consider international investments; domestic




As a robustness check, we also consider the number of investment projects 𝑛𝑖𝑗 of investor
country i in target country j, with 𝑁𝑖 representing the total number of investment
projects in target country i.
We construct two data sets: First, a unilateral data set of 𝑌𝑖 with 𝑖 = {1, .., 𝑃}, which
considers all low– and middle–income countries. To examine whether the determinants
of these specific international transactions resemble those of FDI in manufacturing,
we also include UNCTAD data on FDI flows, 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖, from 2000 to 2013 for low– and
middle–income countries.5 The unilateral data set contains 145 observations, of which 70
are non–zero. In total, there are 820 land deals with a total size of 22.9 million hectares.
5Unfortunately, this data is not available for bilateral flows; it only covers receiving (or sending)
countries.
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For the unilateral data set, we estimate (I) the total hectare size of land acquisitions in
country i, and (II) FDI flows from 2000 to 2013 in low– and middle–income countries
𝑖 = {1, .., 𝑃} for a set of country characteristics 𝑋𝑖.
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (I)
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (II)
Second, we construct a bilateral data set of 𝑦𝑖𝑗 with 𝑖 = {1, .., 𝑃} and 𝑗 = {1, .., 𝐶}
(and 𝑛𝑖𝑗 with 𝑖 = {1, .., 𝑃} and 𝑗 = 1, .., 𝐶). We hence consider all investor coun-
try–host country pairs, excluding the possibility of land being acquired in high–income
countries. The data set ultimately consists of 30, 806 possible investor country–host
country combinations6 and includes 146 possible target countries, of which 70 actually
are the targets of investment, and 212 possible investor countries, of which 61 countries
actually do invest.
For the bilateral data set, we employ gravity model specifications that are widely used
in empirical analyses of bilateral trade flows and FDI. More recently, gravity equations
have been backed up by theoretical explanations.7 For instance, Anderson and van Win-
coop (2003) suggest including multilateral resistance terms to account for the relative
attractiveness of host and investor countries. The propensity to trade (and the propen-
sity to invest abroad) is determined not only by the respective countries but also by all
other potential trading partners.
We regress pairs of land acquisitions 𝑦𝑖𝑗 with 𝑖 = {1, .., 𝑃} and 𝑗 = {1, .., 𝐶} using a
set of variables from target country 𝑋𝑖, investor country 𝑋𝑗, and characteristics of pair
𝑋𝑖𝑗 as well as an error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗.
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑖 + 𝑎2𝑋𝑗 + 𝑎3𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (III)
2.3.2 Hypotheses
The Land Matrix data is complemented with explanatory variables that test hypotheses
based on the theoretical considerations introduced in section 2.2.2.8 All explanatory
variables are taken from the year 2000, the same year the Land Matrix started counting
LSLAs.
• To test whether traditional determinants of trade and FDI play a role for
6146 ∗ 212 = 30, 952. When we delete the 146 domestic pairs, we end up with 30, 806 possible
combinations. We construct our list from the World Bank list of economies as of July 2013. However,
in the regressions, we lose a large share of these possible combinations due to limited data availability
for the independent variables. Please see Table 2.11 in the Appendix for a list of host and investor
countries.
7See Anderson and Wincoop (2004) and Salvatici (2013) for an overview.
8A full list of explanatory variables and their sources can be found in the Appendix 2.12.
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LSLAs for agriculture, we include common official language, colonial relationship,
and weighted geographical distance between two economies.
• To test the claim that investments in agriculture seek to deal with im-
balances in food supply in their country of origin, we include net agricultural
imports per capita. Positive values indicate that a country imports agricultural
commodities; negative values indicate that it exports. Reporting this indicator in
per capita values accounts for the size of an economy.
• We also assume that market–seeking factors are negligible. Hence, we include
gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy for market size, and GDP per capita to
capture the purchasing power.
• To test whether investments are resource–seeking, we include the following
variables: To measure land endowments, we include the agricultural area per capita
as well as a measure for the potentially available land (in per cent) derived from
the added percentage of forest land and grassland and woodland9 (based on data
available on the Global Agro–Ecological Zones (GAEZ) webpage, operated by the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Inter-
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)). Moreover, we include
water availability, based on the total actual renewable water resources per capita
according to FAO Aquastat.
• To test the claim that investors are attracted by low agricultural produc-
tivity in target countries, we include agricultural productivity, measured as the
net production value for agriculture per 100 hectares of permanent crops (FAO).
• Lastly, we assume that the institutional quality of host countries has am-
biguous effects on LSLA. To measure institutional quality generally, we use the
control of corruption rank from the World Governance Indicators. To measure spe-
cific institutions, we include the following: to capture the business environment,
we include data from the Doing Business survey; as a specific measure of land
governance, we include the land tenure insecurity index; to measure protection of
property rights, we include the property rights indicator from the Heritage Foun-
dation. However, for these specific institutional variables, data is only available
for a limited sample of countries. Hence, we take up these variables only in the
robustness checks in section 2.4.3.
Finally, we include the distance to the equator and the population density as control
variables. To control for agglomeration effects, we further include a variable that counts
all the projects in a host country and all the projects of an investor. If a country already
hosts investment projects, other investors might follow suit. Moreover, we include re-
gional dummies for host countries and investors, with Northern Europe as the reference
9We do not consider forests and grassland and woodland to be readily available for agriculture, and
we acknowledge that these areas do fulfill important ecosystem services. We use this indicator as a
proxy to indicate potential for agricultural expansion.
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group. In order to account for multilateral resistance, we include fixed effects for each
host and investor country.10
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics
Dependent variable
In examining the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, the sum of all land
acquired, of both the unilateral and the bilateral data set, we find that out of the
total, 80 observations are zero (30, 483 in the bilateral case); hence, there are only 66
non–zero observations (323 in the bilateral case). The sum of all land acquired varies
across the observations: most observations are rather small in size, but we also find 44
host–investor pairs with deals between 50, 000 and 100, 000 hectares and even 53 pairs
with deals amounting to over 100, 000 hectares (see Table 2.1). Hence, we have an excess
of zeros in our data set.
Moreover, when we look at the variance and the mean of the cumulative hectare size,
the data suggests there is overdispersion (Table 2.2).
Considering the number of projects (see Table 2.3), a similar picture emerges: while
most observations have only a few projects, some have a large number (for example,
113 as the maximum number for the unilateral data set and 45 as the maximum for the
bilateral data set).
Hence, we find that our dependent variable, the sum of all land acquired, is skewed to
the right (excess of zeros) and overdispersed (variance is greater than the mean). This
has important implications for data analysis.
10We tested a great number of specifications with different variables. Those variables that did not
make it into the final specification are listed in table 2.12 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.1: Sum of all land acquired per host country (𝑌𝑖) and per host–target pair (𝑦𝑖𝑗)






















Unilateral 80 2 9 6 2 4 5 38 146
Bilateral 30,483 28 65 41 36 56 44 53 30,806
Please note that for some deals the information on hectare size is missing. This explains why
we have more zero observations here than in table 2.3.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics on the sum of all land acquired per host country (𝑌𝑖) and
per host–target pair (𝑦𝑖𝑗)
Obser–
vations
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Variance (in
mn)
Unilateral 66 341,678 571,077 220 3,426,762 326,000
Bilateral 326 70,384 155,273 200 800,000 24,100
Includes only non–zero observations. Please note that for some deals the information on
hectare size is missing. This explains why we have fewer non–zero observations here.
Table 2.3: Number of projects per host country (𝑁𝑖) and per host–target pair (𝑛𝑖𝑗)
(𝑁𝑖)/(𝑛𝑖𝑗) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6–10 11–20 > 21 Total
Unilateral 76 18 6 8 7 3 9 9 10 146
Bilateral 30,469 216 53 14 18 7 21 4 4 30,806
Independent variable
Table 2.4 displays the means of the independent variables for host–investor country pairs
and different groups of countries: potential host countries (146), those that actually
become a host (70), potential investors (212), and those that actually do invest (64).11
Looking at the host–investor country pairs, we find that the mean distance between two
countries is more than 8, 000 km. Seventeen per cent of all pairs share a common official
language; only one per cent have a past colonial relationship. Actual host countries are
closest to the equator and exhibit higher GDPs but lower GDPs per capita than potential
host countries. They are marked by relatively low population densities, despite the fact
that they are populous relative to potential hosts. While the agricultural area per
capita in host countries is a bit lower than that in potential host countries, there is more
potentially available land (77 per cent). The water availability is lower than in the group
11Please note, that we do not report ‘all countries’ in our sample, as this is identical to all potential
investors: the group of potential investors includes all potential host countries.
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of potential hosts but higher than for actual investors. Actual host countries are net
exporters of commodities and are marked by low agricultural productivity. Moreover,
actual hosts (and for that matter, potential hosts) perform badly in terms of institutions:
their control of corruption rank is low (36).
Actual investors can be described as the richest group of countries, in terms of both
GDP and GDP per capita. They have large populations and are densely populated.
While in absolute terms the agricultural area per capita is rather high, the share that is
available is lower than that in the other groups of countries (66.8 per cent). In terms of
water, actual investors are water scarce in comparison but the most productive in terms
of agricultural productivity and the least corrupt according to the control of corruption
rank.
These descriptive statistics thus lend support to some of the hypotheses formulated
above and to be tested in the following section: Resource endowments differ between
hosts and investors. Investors are particularly water scarce, and hosts have the largest
share of land available for agricultural production. With low values for GDP, GDP per
capita, and population, actual host countries do not satisfy the typical market–seeking
objectives. Differences between agricultural productivity are also pronounced, and the
institutional indicator hints at low institutional quality in host countries.
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2.4 Econometric results
In this section, we first run regressions for the unilateral data set, and then for the
bilateral data set. Finally, we implement several robustness checks.
2.4.1 Results of unilateral regressions
We start off with a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (robust standard
errors), and then use a tobit regression to better handle censoring in the land acquisition
data. We refrain from using a two–step model such as the Heckmann selection model
as we assume that the same set of variables determines whether a country is selected
as a recipient and how much land is acquired. Hence, we lack a meaningful exclusion
restriction.
Coefficients cannot be interpreted directly in the context of a nonlinear tobit model.
For the land acquisitions data, we hence report marginal effects on the expected value,
conditional on being uncensored, 𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑋𝑖), in Table 2.5 (Williams, 2012). We calculate
them at the mean of the respective covariates.13 For the FDI data, we report OLS results
as the FDI data has no censoring problem. For both regressions, we use a logarithmic
transformation of the dependent variables. In order not to lose zero observations, we
add 1 to our dependent variable before we transform it: 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑖 + 1) and 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 + 1).
OLS results for the land acquisition data set is reported in table 2.8 in the Appendix.
In the following, we use two different specifications: The first specification includes
classical market–seeking objectives and regional dummies. The next specification adds a
number of explanatory variables. Comparing the results with these different dependent
variables allows us to assess whether the determinants of land–based agricultural FDI
are indeed different from those of traditional forms of FDI.
First, concerning market–seeking factors, we do find similar effects for GDP for land
acquisitions (the two columns on the left) and FDI (the two columns on the right):
GDP is positive and strongly significant in both cases but the effect is larger for land
acquisitions (a 1 per cent increase in GDP results in a 1.53 per cent increase in the
sum of all land acquired—or in a 0.69 per cent increase in FDI). GDP per capita is
negative (–1.86) and strongly significant for land acquisitions, for the FDI data set
the sign changes in the two specifications. The most pronounced difference is in the
net agricultural imports: while net agricultural imports turn out negative with a high
magnitude for land acquisition data (an increase of 1, 000 USD per capita is associated
with a 5.92 per cent decrease in the sum of all land acquired), it is positive for FDI data.
Hence, receivers of land investments seem to be exporters, while receivers of FDI seem
to be importers.14
13We use Stata 11’s margin command to calculate the marginal effects. Marginal effects can be inter-
preted as elasticities when the dependent and independent variables are in logs. We get semi–elasticities
when the independent variables is in levels.
14We can rule out reverse causality as we use values for agricultural imports from 2000 and only
start counting projects from 2000 onwards.
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Second, we find no differences in terms of resources and agricultural productivity: Both
samples yield positive effects for the agricultural area and water (but the magnitude is
larger in the land acquisition sample; for example, a 1 per cent increase in the agricultural
area (water resources) per capita results in a 0.79 (1.02) per cent increase in the sum of
all land acquired and a 0.62 (0.47) per cent increase in FDI). The share of land available
is negative in both cases—but with small coefficients. Third, agricultural productivity
and institutions yield positive effects in both cases but are only statistically significant
in the FDI data set.
Table 2.5: Estimation for log cumulative hectare size and for log FDI flows
Tobit: Marginal effects at the means OLS
Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑖 + 1) Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 + 1)
(I) (II) (I) (II)
log_GDP 1.532*** 1.008*** 0.691*** 0.924***
(0.271) (0.164) (0.102) (0.0859)
log_GDP_pc -1.862*** -0.890** 0.160 -0.534*













Controls YES YES YES YES
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 108 104 108 104
Censored obs. 49 46
𝑅2 0.578 0.657
𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜𝑅2 0.199 0.244
Controls included but not reported: Population density and log distance to the equator.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
These results at large are inconclusive, so we turn towards the bilateral data set, which
allows us to increase our number of observations considerably. Unfortunately, we can no
longer compare land acquisitions to FDI as data on bilateral FDI flows is not available
for a large set of countries.
2.4.2 Results of bilateral regressions
For the bilateral data set, we use a gravity model specification. A testable gravity equa-
tion is achieved by taking logarithms from both sides of the multiplicative form of the
gravity model (Burger, Oort, and Linders, 2009). In the traditional literature, OLS is
34
2 The relationship between foreign LSLAs and agricultural FDI
used to estimate these log–normal gravity specifications, leading to three major prob-
lems: the logarithmic transformation creates a bias, the homoscedasticity assumption is
violated, and the dependent variable contains observations with the value of zero. Al-
though gravitational force can never be zero, trade between two economies may simply be
non–existent. Zeros could also stem from rounding errors or missing values (see Burger,
Oort, and Linders (2009) for a more detailed discussion). Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006, 2011) propose employing Poisson estimators, which can handle heteroscedasticity
and which are considered a ‘promising workhorse for the estimation of gravity equa-
tions’. They suggest using a Poisson pseudo–maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator.
This approach has some critics (Martínez-Zarzoso, 2013) but is generally approved of
(e.g. Arezki, Deininger, and Selod (2013) and Arvis and Shepherd (2013)).
We follow the literature and use a PPML estimator,15 thereby addressing the problems
of zero–inflation and overdispersion. But we also test other models in section 2.4.3 as
a robustness check. To test the adequacy of the model, we employ a RESET test,
as suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The test checks the significance of
an additional regressor. P–values are reported at the bottom of Table 2.6, low values
suggest to reject the hypothesis that the model is correctly specified.
PPML allows us to use the dependent variable, the sum of all land acquired, without
logarithmic transformation. We divide it by 1, 000.16 We use three different specifica-
tions: The first specification tests a simple gravity equation with market–seeking objec-
tives, bilateral variables, and regional dummies. The next specification adds a number
of explanatory variables, and the third specification includes investor and host–country
fixed effects to account for multilateral resistance terms (Anderson and van Wincoop,
2003).
Table 2.6: Pseudo-Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Dependent variable: 𝑦𝑖𝑗/1000
(I) (II) (III)
log_distance -1.083*** -1.237*** -1.385***
(0.153) (0.147) (0.182)
common_language 1.310*** 1.486*** 1.302***
(0.303) (0.373) (0.367)












15Implemented in Stata through their user-written ppml–command.
16Coefficients of logged variables can be interpreted as elasticities, coefficients of non–logged variables
as semi–elasticities.
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Controls YES YES YES
Regional Dummies YES YES
Host–/Investor–country fixed effects YES
Observations 14700 14214 26520
𝑅2 0.398 0.440 0.461
RESET test p–value 0.0704 0.0271 .
Controls included but not reported: Population density, log distance to the equator, number of
deals.
We use the ‘keep’ option in Stata to override the default to drop observations.
RESET test in specification (III) could not be performed (‘constraint dropped’.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
First, we can assert that the bilateral variables yield the expected results: distance has
negative effects (for example, a 1 per cent increase in distance reduces the sum of all
land acquired by 1.08/1.24/1.39 per cent, a slightly higher amount than in estimates by
Santos Silva and Tenreyro: –0.776 for PPML), and a common official language, and a
former colonial relationship are conducive to the size of land acquired.
Second, whether these investments follow marketing–seeking objectives is rather un-
clear: while GDP, a proxy for market size, is statistically significant and positive for host
countries (a 1 per cent increase is related to a 0.29 per cent increase in the sum of all
land acquired), GDP per capita is negative; hence, market size seems to play a role while
the purchasing power certainly cannot be identified as a main driver. For investors, we
find positive effects for both, GDP and GDP per capita. For net agricultural imports,
we find strong negative impacts for host countries (an increase of 1, 000 USD per capita
results in a 2.35 per cent decrease in the sum of all land acquired). Hence, being an
exporter seems to be conducive to receiving investments.
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Third, the resource variables support the hypothesis that the resources of target coun-
tries are important: For host countries, we do find positive statistically significant effects
for the agricultural area, and water resources while the share of land available for agri-
culture is statistically significant and negative. The same variables are a little less clear
for investor countries.
Fourth, looking at agricultural productivity, we find no significant results; negative in
the case of host countries and positive in the case of investor countries. High productivity
on the part of target countries is hence associated with lower areas of acquired land.
Fifth, we find generally positive effects of institutions measured through the control
of corruption rank. For example, if the rank of host country increases by one, the sum
of all land acquired increases by 0.011 per cent.
We further find negative effects for population density and the distance from the
equator—for both investors and host countries—and positive agglomeration effects, mea-
sured through the number of investments, of investors, and of host countries.
2.4.3 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our results for the bilateral data set, we run a simple OLS
(see Table 2.9 in the Appendix) using the same specification as for the PPML estimator.
As in the unilateral regressions, we use a logarithmic transformation of the cumulative
hectare size, 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 1). The results are generally consistent with the results presented
above but the size of effects is much less for OLS coefficients.
Moreover, we use the same specification with count data: our dependent variable is
the number of investments projects 𝑛𝑖𝑗 of investor country i in target country j. We
started off with a Poisson regression, then used a negative binomial model. AIC and BIC
criteria and the likelihood ratio test confirm that the negative binomial specification fits
better with our data. We then settled on a zero–inflated17 negative binomial regression
as proposed by Burger, Oort, and Linders (2009); the Vuong statistics confirm that this
model is better than the normal form (see bottom row in Table 2.10 in the Appendix).
All results are generally consistent with the results presented above.
17Zero–inflated models assume that zeros are generated by two distinct processes, which makes sense
both from a methodological and a theoretical point of view if one expects many zeros to be missing
values. Zero–inflated models assume two latent groups: a group that is always zero (i.e. never has the
chance to have an investment) and a group that has a probability greater than zero to have positive
counts (i.e. there is a chance to have investments). Zero–inflated models first estimate a logit regression
that indicates how variables influence the ‘always–zero–group’, and a negative binomial regression/Pois-
son for those in the ‘not-always-zero-group’ (Long and Freese, 2001). We display only the results from
the ‘not always zero group’ (see Table 2.10 in the Appendix).
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Table 2.7: Pseudo–poisson maximum likelihood estimation with additional institutional






























Regional Dummies YES YES
Observations 7905 8265
𝑅2 0.696 0.682
Controls included but not reported: Population density, log distance to the equator, and number
of deals.
We use the ‘keep’ option in Stata to override the default to drop observations.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Furthermore, we include more variables to measure institutions. We use specification II
of the former model but leave out the control of corruption rank and instead use a number
of institutional variables as indicated in Table 2.7. The political institutions indicator
is an alternative measure for the general institutional quality. It turns out, as expected,
to be positive for host countries and investor countries. The property rights indicator
turns out positive for host countries, against our expectation. The sign for land tenure
insecurity of host countries is positive and statistically significant, which suggests that
insecure land tenure is beneficial to land acquisitions. The dummies that mark corrupt
host and investor countries are negative (and statistically significant). Interestingly, the
dummy for both corrupt host and corrupt investor countries is positive and significant.
38
2 The relationship between foreign LSLAs and agricultural FDI
Hence, the claim of institutional distance is supported.
As the sample size is small and as most results remain insignificant, the conclusions
that can be drawn from these regressions are limited. With this in mind, we cautiously
take these results as an indication that the effect of institutions might indeed be ambigu-
ous: general institutional quality and investor protection seem to be conducive to land
acquisitions, while poor land tenure is not problematic. Moreover, corrupt countries
generally yield negative results, but the effect is positive if both countries are corrupt.
2.5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper has contributed to the existing literature in two key regards. First, we have
clarified the relationship between LSLAs for agriculture and FDI. We have argued that
LSLAs are a specific form of FDI—namely, land–based agricultural FDI. By shedding
light on the determinants of FDI in the manufacturing sector, we have developed hy-
potheses regarding how the determinants of FDI in manufacturing and of land–based
agricultural FDI are similar and how they differ. Land–based agricultural FDI is—like
any other form of FDI—driven by the desire to find a low–cost production location and
the choice to internalize production. Thus, most determinants of FDI in manufacturing
can be transferred to our specific form of FDI—for example, a common language or the
distance between economies.
However, we also assume that there are several reasons why land–based agricultural
FDI is different. Firstly, securing access to food and energy resources is thought to play
a major role in such FDI, while market–seeking factors are negligible. Secondly, land
and water endowments are salient, as these immobile inputs cannot be substituted. The
importance of these resources has even grown in recent years as pressure on land and
water has increased. Thirdly, in many developing countries land prices are low due to
low agricultural productivity or due to prices that fail to reflect the value of the land.
This in turn attracts large numbers of investors, amongst them speculators. Fourthly,
land acquisitions take place under land governance systems with vaguely defined and
overlapping land rights. Investors might thus be tempted to take advantage of this
situation. Corrupt investors are expected to invest in corrupt environments.
Second, we have tested these hypotheses empirically based on Land Matrix and
UNCTAD data. We estimated a tobit regression with a sample of unilateral data,
which we compared to FDI data. Then we used a PPML estimator for a bilateral data
set. With regard to strategic considerations, market size and purchasing power can-
not be identified as key drivers of land acquisitions. We have further found that for
host countries it is detrimental to be a per–capita food importer. This suggests that
investors favour countries with experience in commodity exports. We have determined
that land and water resources indeed play an important role for investment decisions.
The findings on agricultural productivity remain unclear, and the results on institutions
are largely insignificant. Generally, we have identified positive signs for the control of
corruption rank and hence conclude that the general institutional quality is important.
We have included some further variables in the robustness check and have found some
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support for the claim that institutions are ambiguous: while the protection of investors
is important, poor land tenure is not problematic.
Guided by these initial empirical tests of our hypotheses, more empirical studies should
be conducted, using more accurate data. However, with the data at hand we cannot
present more robust empirical results, for a number of reasons: First of all, our data
cannot distinguish cases of speculation from implemented projects. While we have in-
formation on concluded contracts, we have little information about what happens on
the land after a contract has been concluded. In addition, we do not find clear results
for agricultural productivity, our proxy for low land prices. Hence, it is difficult to dis-
tinguish investors, who are attracted by low land prices and the opportunity of high
returns on their investment, from speculators, who take advantage of land prices that
are too low. Second, like any macro study, we neglect regional disparities within the
same country. We assume that this is a more pronounced problem in agriculture than in
manufacturing. To give an example, an investor seeks land in a water–scarce country but
targets a water–abundant region. Water would be a major determinant that would not
be captured in our estimations. Similarly, based on georeferenced sub–Saharan African
land deals, Schoneveld (2014) calls for an analysis that takes into account differences
across regions and individual investment projects. Third, to test our hypotheses we
would need strong variables on institutions; these are not available for a large set of
countries. Fourth, in order to scrutinize determinants of agricultural FDI in comparison
to those of general FDI, comparable data sets for both land acquisitions and FDI are
necessary.
Data sources
Institutional Profiles Database. http://www.cepii.fr/institutions/EN/ipd.asp (vis-
ited on 30/10/2013).
FAO Aquastat. http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/ (visited on 09/11/2013).
FAOStat. http://faostat3.fao.org/faostat-gateway/go/to/home/E (visited on 30/10/2013).
FAO. GAEZ. http://www.fao.org/nr/gaez/en/ (visited on 30/10/2013).
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M.. World Governance Indicators. http://
govindicators.org (visited on 30/10/2013).
Laitin, D.D., Moortgat, J., Robinson, A.L. (2012). Geographic axes and the persis-
tence of cultural diversity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109 (26),
10263–10268. http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1205338109/
-/DCSupplemental/sd01.xlsx (visited on 30/06/2014).
Land Matrix. International Land Coalition (ILC), Centre de Coopération Internationale
en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD), Centre for Development
and Environment (CDE),German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). http://landmatrix.
org/ (visited on 01/09/2014).
OECD.Stat Extracts. http://stats.oecd.org/ (visited on 23/06/2014).







Table 2.8: OLS (unilateral)



















Regional Dummies YES YES
Observations 108 104
𝑅2 0.546 0.606
Controls included but not reported: Population density and log distance to the equator. * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Bilateral results: Hectare size
Table 2.9: OLS (bilateral)




























Controls YES YES YES
Regional Dummies YES YES
Host–/Investor–country
fixed effects YES
Observations 14700 14214 26520
𝑅2 0.117 0.121 0.107
Controls included but not reported: Population density, log distance to the equator, and number
of deals. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Bilateral results: Count model












































Regional Dummies YES YES
N 14700 14214
Vuong (z) 5.28 5.49
AIC 2368.86 2285.78
BIC 2938.53 3026.86
Controls included but not reported: Population density, log distance to the equator, and number
of deals. The third specification with importer and host–country fixed effects is not calculated




Host– and investor countries
Table 2.11: Frequency of host/investor observations in gravity model, by country18
Investor19 Host20
Iso3c Country
Codes Country n > 0 n = 0 n > 0 n = 0
ABW Aruba 0 136
AFG Afghanistan 0 135 0 195
AGO Angola 0 135 9 186
ALB Albania 0 135 0 195
AND Andorra 0 136
ARE United Arab Emirates 14 122
ARG Argentina 4 131 21 174
ARM Armenia 0 135 0 195
ATG Antigua and Barbuda 0 135 0 195
AUS Australia 4 132
AUT Austria 3 133
AZE Azerbaijan 0 135 0 195
BDI Burundi 0 135 0 195
BEL Belgium 13 123
BEN Benin 0 135 2 193
BFA Burkina Faso 0 135 2 193
BGD Bangladesh 0 135 2 193
BGR Bulgaria 0 135 0 195
BHR Bahrain 4 132
BHS Bahamas 0 136
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 135 0 195
BLR Belarus 0 135 0 195
BLZ Belize 0 135 0 195
BMU Bermuda 0 136
BOL Bolivia 0 135 3 192
BRA Brazil 6 129 16 179
BRB Barbados 0 136
BRN Brunei 0 136
BTN Bhutan 0 135 0 195
BWA Botswana 0 135 0 195
CAF Central African Republic 0 135 1 194
CAN Canada 23 113
CHE Switzerland 5 131
CHL Chile 0 135 2 193
CHN China 80 55 7 188
CIV Cote d’Ivoire 3 132 8 187
CMR Cameroon 0 135 7 188
COD Democratic Republic of the Congo 0 135 8 187
COG Congo 0 135 4 191
COL Colombia 0 135 10 185
COM Comoros 0 135 0 195
CPV Cape Verde 1 134 0 195
CRI Costa Rica 0 135 1 194
CUB Cuba 0 135 0 195
CYM Cayman Islands 0 136
CYP Cyprus 0 136
CZE Czech Republic 0 136
DEU Germany 10 126
DJI Djibouti 3 132 0 195
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DMA Dominica 0 135 0 195
DNK Denmark 9 127
DOM Dominican Republic 0 135 0 195
DZA Algeria 1 134 0 195
ECU Ecuador 0 135 0 195
EGY Egypt 4 131 6 189
ERI Eritrea 0 135 0 195
ESP Spain 7 129
EST Estonia 0 136
ETH Ethiopia 0 135 66 129
FIN Finland 0 136
FJI Fiji 0 135 0 195
FRA France 32 104
FRO Faroe Islands 0 136
FSM Micronesia 0 135 0 195
GAB Gabon 0 135 4 191
GBR United Kingdom 97 39
GEO Georgia 0 135 1 194
GHA Ghana 0 135 25 170
GIN Guinea 0 135 5 190
GMB Gambia 0 135 1 194
GNB Guinea-Bissau 0 135 0 195
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 0 136
GRC Greece 0 136
GRD Grenada 0 135 0 195
GRL Greenland 0 136
GTM Guatemala 0 135 2 193
GUY Guyana 0 135 0 195
HKG Hong Kong 18 118
HND Honduras 0 135 1 194
HRV Croatia 0 136
HTI Haiti 0 135 0 195
HUN Hungary 1 135
IDN Indonesia 1 134 133 62
IND India 38 97 5 190
IRL Ireland 0 136
IRN Iran 1 134 0 195
IRQ Iraq 0 135 0 195
ISL Iceland 0 136
ISR Israel 7 129
ITA Italy 19 117
JAM Jamaica 0 135 1 194
JOR Jordan 0 135 0 195
JPN Japan 11 125
KAZ Kazakhstan 0 135 2 193
KEN Kenya 5 130 4 191
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic 0 135 0 195
KHM Cambodia 2 133 84 111
KIR Kiribati 0 135 0 195
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 135 0 195
KOR South Korea 16 120
KWT Kuwait 3 133
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LAO Laos 0 135 41 154
LBN Lebanon 0 135 0 195
LBR Liberia 0 135 11 184
LBY Libya 4 131 0 195
LCA Saint Lucia 0 135 0 195
LKA Sri Lanka 10 125 1 194
LSO Lesotho 0 135 0 195
LTU Lithuania 0 135 2 193
LUX Luxembourg 5 131
LVA Latvia 0 136
MAR Morocco 0 135 2 193
MDA Moldova 0 135 0 195
MDG Madagascar 0 135 10 185
MDV Maldives 0 135 0 195
MEX Mexico 0 135 1 194
MHL Marshall Islands 0 135 0 195
MKD Macedonia 0 135 0 195
MLI Mali 0 135 13 182
MLT Malta 0 136
MMR Myanmar 0 135 1 194
MNG Mongolia 2 133 0 195
MNP mnp 0 136
MOZ Mozambique 0 135 53 142
MRT Mauritania 0 135 1 194
MUS Mauritius 6 129 1 194
MWI Malawi 0 135 2 193
MYS Malaysia 80 55 9 186
NAM Namibia 0 135 2 193
NCL New Caledonia 0 136
NER Niger 2 133 0 195
NGA Nigeria 3 132 14 181
NIC Nicaragua 0 135 0 195
NLD Netherlands 15 121
NOR Norway 5 131
NPL Nepal 0 135 0 195
NZL New Zealand 2 134
OMN Oman 0 136
PAK Pakistan 1 134 4 191
PAN Panama 0 135 0 195
PER Peru 0 135 0 195
PHL Philippines 0 135 24 171
PLW Palau 0 135 0 195
PNG Papua New Guinea 0 135 27 168
POL Poland 0 136
PRI Puerto Rico 0 136
PRK North Korea 0 135 0 195
PRT Portugal 11 125
PRY Paraguay 0 135 4 191
PYF French Polynesia 0 136
QAT Qatar 2 134
RUS Russia 0 135 6 189
RWA Rwanda 0 135 2 193
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SAU Saudi Arabia 23 113
SDN Sudan 0 135 16 179
SEN Senegal 0 135 13 182
SGP Singapore 43 93
SLB Solomon Islands 0 135 0 195
SLE Sierra Leone 0 135 15 180
SLV El Salvador 0 135 0 195
SMR San Marino 0 136
SOM Somalia 0 135 0 195
STP Sao Tome and Principe 0 135 0 195
SUR Suriname 0 135 0 195
SVK Slovak Republic 0 136
SVN Slovenia 0 136
SWE Sweden 7 129
SWZ Swaziland 0 135 1 194
SYC Seychelles 0 135 0 195
SYR Syria 0 135 0 195
TCA Turks and Caicos Islands 0 136
TCD Chad 0 135 0 195
TGO Togo 0 135 0 195
THA Thailand 21 114 1 194
TJK Tajikistan 0 135 0 195
TKM Turkmenistan 0 135 0 195
TON Tonga 0 135 0 195
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 0 136
TUN Tunisia 0 135 0 195
TUR Turkey 7 128 1 194
TUV Tuvalu 0 135 0 195
TZA Tanzania 0 135 26 169
UGA Uganda 0 135 7 188
UKR Ukraine 0 135 4 191
URY Uruguay 0 135 35 160
USA United States 60 76
UZB Uzbekistan 0 135 0 195
VCT Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0 135 0 195
VEN Venezuela 0 135 0 195
VNM Vietnam 42 93 3 192
VUT Vanuatu 0 135 0 195
WSM Samoa 0 135 0 195
YEM Yemen 0 135 0 195
ZAF South Africa 21 114 0 195
ZMB Zambia 0 135 20 175
ZWE Zimbabwe 5 130 2 193
18We only display those countries that have information on independent variables and are thus in-
cluded in our regressions. Specification III has the most observation (26,520), which is why we take all
those countries, that specification III uses, to display, here.
19Investor countries include all countries of the world, according to the World Bank list of economies
as of July 2013. As we keep high-income countries, we have more countries as possible investors than
we have as possible targets.




Table 2.12: Definition of explanatory variables and source
Variable coded Explanation Source Year
Main specification
Weighted distance 𝑙𝑜𝑔_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 Weighted distance be-tween host and investor. CEPII n.a.
Common official
language 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛_𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒
Host and investor have a
common official language CEPI n.a.
Colony 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟_𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦
Former colonial relation-




GDP (absolute) in inter-
nat. $ constant 2005 PPP
in 2000
WDI 2000
GDP per capita 𝑙𝑜𝑔_𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑝𝑐 GDP/population WDI 2000






Total Import Value (1000
US$) in 2000 – Agri-
cultural Products, Total




(in 1000 ha) per
capita














Total annual actual re-
newable water resources






Net production value for
agriculture, in constant
2004-2006 1000 interna-
tional $ divided by area




tion 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 Rank between 1 and 183. WGI 2000
Population Density 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 Population per total landarea in 𝑘𝑚2. WDI 2000
Distance from
equator 𝑙𝑜𝑔_𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟









Additional institutional variables (robustness checks)
Political institu-
tions 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
Scaled between 1 (low
functioning of political in-
stitutions) and 4 (high
functioning).
IPD 2012







Scaled between 1 (low in-
security) and 4 ( high in-
security).
IPD 2012






Dummy that turns one if
host and/or investor coun-
try has a control of cor-
ruption rank below 34.
WGI 2000
Explanatory variables not included
Active population in agriculture as a share of working-age population and average years of schooling to
test labour endowments.
Gini index of land concentration.
Institutional alternatives: different variables from the World Governance Indicators including an indi-
cator calculated through principal component analysis and the Doing Business survey.
Phone lines (in 2000) to control for infrastructure.
Rate of urbanization as a control for development.
Regional trade agreements.
Share of area below a yield gap of 40 per cent (inefficient) and the share of area above a yield gap of
70 per cent (efficient) as an alternative measure for agricultural productivity.
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3 Interplay of land governance and
large–scale agricultural investment:
evidence from Ghana and Kenya 1
Kerstin Nolte & Susanne Johanna Väth
This chapter appeared as Kerstin Nolte and Susanne Johanna Väth (2015).
“Interplay of land governance and large-scale agricultural investment:
evidence from Ghana and Kenya”. In: The Journal of Modern African
Studies 53.01, pp. 69–92
Abstract
This comparative analysis examines how large–scale agricultural land acquisitions are
implemented in Ghana and Kenya, using embedded case studies of two specific invest-
ment projects. We find that insufficiencies in these countries’ land governance systems
are partly caused by discrepancies between de jure and de facto procedures and that
powerful actors tend to operate in the legal grey areas. These actors determine the im-
plementation of projects to a large extent. Displacement and compensation are highly
emotive issues that exacerbate tensions around the investment. We also find that large–
scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) have a feedback effect on the land governance system,
which suggests that LSLAs can be drivers of institutional change. We suggest there may
be a window of opportunity here to reform these land governance systems.
1We would like to thank the people and organisations who supported our research: David Okeyo,
Caren Akumu, Baba Adams, and Eric Johnson, for help with the focus group discussions; the Ghana
Market–oriented Agriculture Programme (MOAP), a joint programme of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture of the Republic of Ghana (MOFA), for financial and
logistical support; the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) (Germany), the Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (Germany), and the sector project ‘Land
Policy and Land Management’, a planning unit of the German Agency for International Co–operation
(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GIZ), for financial support; and Michael
Kirk, Jann Lay, Simone Gobien, Thomas Falk, and two anonymous reviewers, for valuable comments
on the paper. Any shortcomings are of course ours.
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4 Large–scale agricultural investments
under poor land governance in
Zambia
Kerstin Nolte
This chapter appeared as Kerstin Nolte (2014). “Large-scale agricultural
investments under poor land governance in Zambia”. In: Land Use Policy
38, pp. 698–706
Abstract1
This paper looks at how large–scale land acquisitions made by foreign investors in Zam-
bia are implemented. It scrutinizes both the steps that an investor has to go through in
order to attain land within the Zambian land governance system as well as the actors
shaping the acquisition process. As the most important formal change introduced to
the Zambian land governance system, the Lands Act 1995, paved the way for foreign
investments in land. The new actor ‘investor’ on the other hand has emerged as a
result of rising prizes for food and non–food commodities. The study finds that the en-
forcement of formal rules in the process of acquiring land is currently weak and largely
determined by a number of actors: while investors, local authorities and government
officials have strong leverage, local land users are excluded from the process. If the pro-
cess of transformations of customary land into state land continues, land administration
will be inevitably shifted toward statutory jurisdiction. As a result, local chiefs will lose
their discretionary power thereby further marginalizing local land users. As it stands,
welfare implications are chiefly down to the individual actors. However, it is only the
government that can issue a guarantee that local land users will also benefit from land
acquisition.
1Field research would not have been possible without the support of various people. I would like
to thank Melinda Lukungu Chipango, Kelvin Chibuye and Setareh Stephan for conducting the field
research with me. Moreover, I would like to express my gratitude to Susanne Neubert and Nadine
Tatge for advising me on particularities of field research in the agricultural sector in Zambia, qualitative
methods and linking me up with important stakeholders. I acknowledge funding provided by the Federal
Ministry of Education and Research (Germany). I thank Jann Lay, Viola Lucas, Julian Mintert, Kacana
Sipangule, Susanne Väth, and an anonymous reviewer for valuable comments and suggestions for this
paper.
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5 Consultation in large–scale land
acquisitions: an evaluation of three
cases in Mali1
Kerstin Nolte & Lieske Voget–Kleschin
This chapter appeared as Kerstin Nolte and Lieske Voget-Kleschin (2014).
“Consultation in Large-Scale Land Acquisitions: An Evaluation of Three
Cases in Mali”. In: World Development 64, pp. 654–668
Abstract
Consultation is widely recognized as an important aspect of fair land deals; however, in
terms of tangible instructions, this aspect remains unspecific. We develop a framework
for consultation in the case of land acquisitions and analyse proposals for consultation
contained in voluntary guidelines and private governance instruments as well as de
jure and—by way of three case studies—de facto consultative processes in Mali. We
acknowledge that consultations take place in complicated settings of power relations
that determine the aims of consultation. In countries with serious background injustice,
regulatory changes that alleviate these inequities are necessary before implementing land
acquisitions.
1The authors wish to thank the Groupe de Recherche en Économie Appliquée et Théorique
(GREAT), in particular Massa Coulibaly, Moussa Coumaré and Djénéba Diarra, and the interviewees
and participants in the focus group discussions, for supporting our research; Jann Lay. Andreas Neef,
Jana Prosinger, Almut Schilling–Vacaflor, Ian Scoones, Susanne Väth and three anonymous reviewers
for comments on earlier versions of this paper; and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research
(Germany) and the Land Deal Politics Initiative (LDPI) Small Grant Competition 2012 for funding
the research.
52
6 Synthesis and future research
6.1 Contribution of this thesis
This dissertation contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the rising global
phenomenon of investments in land through in–depth insights obtained from a cross–
country study as well as from three case–studies based in sub–Saharan Africa.
In particular, Chapter 2 expands on the analysis of Arezki, Deininger, and Selod
(2013) and contributes to the literature on the determinants of large–scale land acqui-
sitions (LSLAs) in two regards: First, it conceptualizes LSLAs for agriculture and puts
them in the context of foreign direct investments (FDIs). On the basis of this conceptu-
alisation, we theoretically analyse whether the determinants of LSLAs for agriculture are
different to those from FDI in manufacturing. We found that LSLAs for agriculture can
be considered a specific subset of FDI as they conform to the Organisation for Economic
Co–operation and Development (OECD) definition of FDI: a direct investor—be it a
private company, a stock–exchange listed company or an investment fund—has interest
in an enterprise abroad, and the contract duration exceeds 25 years or more in most
cases which suggests a long–term relationship. However, we proposed four departures
that explain why the determinants of FDI in agriculture are different from FDI in manu-
racturing. Second, using data from the Land Matrix Global Observatory and UNCTAD
we empirically examined the determinants of land–based agricultural investments vis–
à–vis FDI. The results demonstrate that LSLAs are governed by determinants similar
to FDI in manufacturing, yet the weight of these differs. For instance, resource–seeking
factors play a more pronounced role for investment decisions. Moreover, institutions and
policies are of particular importance to investors. As land acquisitions take place within
land governance systems having vaguely defined and often overlapping land rights, the
effects of institutions are ambiguous rather than clear–cut. Hence, the chapters that
follow the second one each shed more light on different land governance systems across
sub–Saharan Africa.
Chapters 3 and 4 mainly contribute to the literature on the processes surrounding
land acquisitions and provide insights into the transmission channels through which
LSLAs have welfare implications. Chapter 3 compares two investment cases in Ghana
and Kenya, while Chapter 4 conducts a country case study of Zambia. Results suggest
that in all three countries, the land governance systems are not prepared to handle the
increased influx of investors in agricultural land. Weaknesses in the land governance
system are exposed by LSLAs. The discrepancy between de jure and de facto land
administration is salient. Weak de facto rules and their poor enforcement give powerful
actors a distinct role in the acquisition process. Chapter 4 takes a closer look at the
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involved actors. Traditional and government authorities as well as investors negotiate
land deals and determine how they are to be implemented. Local land users are often
neglected in the process. Power relations between actors can change. For instance, the
ongoing transformation from customary to state land results in a gradual shift in power
ownership from traditional to government authorities.
The influential role of certain actors also leads to diverse welfare implications: whether
an investment turns out to be of overall benefit depends on those negotiating the deal.
Chapters 3 and 4 provide initial insights into the underlying transmission channels:
access to land, compensation, food and input prices, food security, employment, in-
frastructure improvements (for example roads, electricity supply, health services, and
school facilities), environmental impacts and technological spillovers (lending of equip-
ment versus the fencing–off of farms). Moreover, Chapter 3 gives detailed examples
of displacement and compensation in the two cases studied, finding these to be highly
emotive issues. Perceptions about welfare implications change over time and are ex-
tremely subjective.Tensions over land can be exacerbated in the course of the project’s
implementation, hence the adequate consultation and inclusion of local communities in
the process is of the utmost importance.
Both chapters find that LSLAs can have repercussions for the land governance system.
Chapter 3 concludes that discontent with the current situation can fuel institutional
change, in both customary and statutory rules. Hence, in such situations a window of
opportunity can open up to reform the institutional framework.
Chapter 5 takes up the finding from the two preceding chapters that adequate con-
sultation is crucial, and looks in greater detail at this specific step in the acquisition
process specifically on the basis of a case study from Mali. Even though consultation
is perceived to be important, tangible instructions for how to undertake it are shown
to be currently lacking. This chapter hence contributes to the literature on LSLAs in
developing a framework for the analysis of related consultations. Our framework departs
from Chambers’ (2005) ‘ladders of participation’, and includes the dimensions of degree
of influence as well as degree of inclusion. We use this framework to assess voluntary
guidelines, private governance instruments as well as de jure and de facto consultation
in Mali. The findings from this assessment are not surprising: voluntary guidelines have
the highest standards for consultation, de jure and de facto consultation differ while de
facto consultation often performs the worst.
My case studies discuss the importance of power relations and the roles that differ-
ent actors play within target countries. Putting these insights into a broader context
and reflecting on policy implications brings into question power relations and the roles
different actors play, also on the global level.
Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate how the land governance systems in Ghana, Kenya and
Zambia are not prepared to handle the influx of LSLAs. There are indeed many short-
comings in the land governance systems of target countries, such as the poor enforcement
of formal rules and a concentration of power in the hands of only a few actors. Such
malfunctioning land governance systems are often identified as the major impediment to
take advantage of the increased interest in the agricultural sector in developing countries.
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Yet, only national governments can provide a functioning institutional framework.
Consequently, LSLAs also elucidate the limits that the international community faces
in the governance of LSLAs. If national governments fail to provide functioning institu-
tional frameworks for LSLAs, the international community can do very little to remedy
the situation. This reality becomes evident, for instance, in Chapter 5: even though
there are voluntary guidelines which are issued by the international community and
include provisions for consultations, such consultations are tied to national legislation
and—in terms of effectiveness—tend to remain well below the targets of these guidelines.
At the same time, there is an imbalance between investors and target country govern-
ments in terms of negotiation capacity which is problematic: some governments from
developing countries, particularly from sub–Saharan Africa, are ill–equipped to negoti-
ate contracts with international corporations. This raises questions about the capacity
of governments from developing countries to accommodate international investors and
again brings into question how these governments could be supported by the interna-
tional community.
As the preceding chapters have highlighted LSLAs are occurrences that trigger change
in institutions, as they have significant effects on land governance systems. This reality
represents a window of opportunity to reform national land administration. National
governments—who are often underfunded and understaffed—can—with the support of
the international community, if needed—now take advantage of this window of oppor-
tunity and act in improving the institutional framework governing land acquisitions.
The support of the international community should extend to legal advice being given
on how to craft mutually beneficial contracts between target country governments and
investors.
In sum, providing a functioning institutional framework lies primarily in the responsi-
bility of target country governments; however, the international community can provide
support to these.
In this context, private companies are often portrayed as a solution to malfunctioning
governments who have hitherto failed to provide basic infrastructure. And, indeed, the
investors of the case studies presented in chapter 3 have committed to providing basic
infrastructure, from roads and electricity supply to investments in hospitals and schools.
At the same time, there is obviously a risk associated with private companies becoming
too powerful. For instance, smallholder farmers in Zambia complained about commercial
investors who flood markets and drive down prizes.
Moreover, the level of responsibility of private companies investing in the world’s poor-
est regions is called into question. First and foremost, such companies pursue commercial
gains and as such the making of altruistic investments in rural infrastructure are highly
unlikely. Even the initial investments to set up a project that need to be made by the
investor are perceived to be too high. Thus, many governments, including those of the
world’s poorest countries provide investment incentives, such as tax exemption schemes.
Nonetheless, Kleemann et al. (2013) argue that investors who decide to enter countries
with unjust institutional backgrounds that privilege certain actors (‘background injus-
tice’) take a particular responsibility.
Private companies should hence aim at utilizing inclusive business models. Projects are
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more likely to be sustainable if they are accepted by the local communities, as Chapter
5 demonstrates. This requires both prior consultation and constant and ongoing in-
volvement throughout every step of the project’s implementation and production phase.
Chapter 3 elucidates how many projects lose support over the years, despite the initial
enthusiasm for them on the part of the local population. As Väth and Kirk (2014) have
shown, contract farming might be a viable solution to the issue of how to include local
farmers during the production phase.
Finally, I highlight the importance of transparency in LSLAs. Many cases of LSLAs
remain opaque, and the challenges of obtaining unbiased data is far from being solved.
Academia and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should hence continue their
efforts to increase such transparency. Insights from research and projects such as the
Land Matrix Global Observatory are important means to move towards a more balanced
and objective debate.
6.2 Future areas of research
LSLAs reflect rising interest in the agricultural sector worldwide. As Chapter 2 shows
they are a specific form of FDI but work differently to FDI in manufacturing. Hence,
we are still in an early stage of fully understanding how land acquisitions function and
how they actually take effect. Nonetheless, knowledge about these questions continues
to grow and today we understand the phenomenon of LSLAs much better than we did
even a few years ago. Based on this emerging knowledge, the debate needs to rationalize
and thus move away from perpetuating stereotypes of either greedy land grabbers or
well–meaning investors and acknowledge instead ongoing and evolving developments.
Many of the debates today are still preoccupied with the ethical question of whether
we even want LSLAs to take place or not. I argue it is now time to expand on these
debates. LSLAs are taking place whether we like it or not. Social–science and land–use
and land–cover change (LULCC) research should thus henceforth focus more on the
wider implications of LSLAs than on their right to occur in the first place.
At the same time, data availability and quality have improved in recent years—even
though scholars still face serious information constraints. A major bottleneck remains
data on the exact locations of LSLAs. However, data in this regard is also improving
at two ends of the spectrum: data on LSLAs is increasing, particularly with regards
to spatial data (Messerli et al., 2014). Moreover satellite images are now able to cover
greater area sizes (for example, the Landsat–8 satellite, which started broadcasting in
2013), while geographic information systems (GIS)–technology is advancing in terms of
land–use classification (Griffiths et al., 2013; Yan and Roy, 2014).
These improvements in data availability and quality allow us to use different method-
ologies for the study of LSLAs. I assume the following aspects will become important in
terms of methodology: Studies based on quantitative data are an important next step
towards better understanding the phenomenon of LSLAs. Case–studies based on qualita-
tive methods—including the ones presented in the different chapters of this thesis—were
an important first step by which to provide insights into a phenomenon marked by se-
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crecy. These types of cases will continue to play a certain role, especially with concern to
understanding the processes and perceptions surrounding land acquisitions. In addition,
analyses henceforth need to be ‘localized’. Regional disparities within countries need to
be taken into account in future, as cross–country studies ultimately have only limited
explanatory power. In this regard, the use of satellite images and GIS will significantly
improve the analysis of LSLAs.
Based on insights derived from my own research discussed above, I identify three cru-
cial areas deserving closer academic attention: First, rising interest in the agricultural
sector worldwide is putting those countries that traditionally do not receive much FDI
on the agenda of investors. Thus, the question of what financial flows these invest-
ments in land induce and how they in turn change the face of agriculture arises. We
are currently witnessing the advancing commercialization of agriculture, a development
that extends to developing countries as well. Old debates—such as those about optimal
farm–size (Deininger, 2011; Deininger and Byerlee, 2012), the role of smallholder agri-
culture in food production (Jayne et al., 2014) as well as the implications of growing
commercialization for the world commodity market—need to be revived in light of these
developments.
Second, LSLAs are drivers of LULCCs (Foley et al., 2005). For instance, this is
exemplified by the many cases of rainforest conversion into pasture in Latin America
and the large–scale plantations in Southeast Asia (Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011; Morton
et al., 2006). However, the role that large–scale agricultural activities play in driving
LULCCs has still not been sufficiently explored to date. Future research should thus
consider the role that commercial agriculture plays in such LULCCs.
Third, a major challenge to development economists is the analysis of the welfare
implications of LSLAs. As discussed in Chapter 1.2, studying welfare implications is
methodologically challenging and hence hardly any systematic evidence on welfare im-
plications of LSLAs exists at present. I assume that the question of how target countries,
and particularly local communities, are affected by LSLAs will most likely increase in im-
portance in the coming years with the ongoing implementation of commercial projects.
Key to this is the fact that a shift occurring from smallholder agriculture to commercial
agriculture obviously significantly affects local communities.
Since welfare implications of LSLAs are subject of heavy debates and of particular
interest to development economics, I will now provide some preliminary ideas about
how they could be more precisely analysed on the basis of more sophisticated data. I
chose here to narrow down the analysis of welfare implications to the spillover effects
experienced by communities adjacent to a LSLA—these effects are strongest in, but by
no means confined to, neighbouring communities, and as such multiplier effects across
communities are likely. In terms of transmission channels, we could use case study
evidence as a point of departure to assess what spillover effects are to be expected. One
challenge that I mentioned earlier was the importance of determining the precise time
horizon to be considered, as such implications may well differ across the timespan of a
project. Hence ideally welfare implications are studied over time, for example based on
several waves of household survey data. Another crucial aspect is to know where exactly
LSLA deals take place and operate. The Land Matrix does provide quite a good overview
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of such deals; however, most of these lack exact locations. Moreover, for many of these
projects we lack information on their actual implementation. Obviously, spillover effects
only occur for those projects that are operational. One feasible alternative to Land
Matrix data would be the use of information derived from satellite imagery and GIS
classification for large–scale agricultural areas.
The combination of household surveys over a longer time–span and an inventory of
operational farms would enable us to use a differences–in–differences design combined
with matching techniques. We could identify the geographical areas in which commercial
farms operate (treatment area) and counterfactuals, those areas in which no commercial
farms are present (control area). Depending on the survey data, we could then assess
the impact of commercial farms on local households, for example in terms of income,
employment, food security, productivity, and/or fertilizer use.
As has been shown, this dissertation has endeveaoured to answer some key questions
which have resulted from the rise in LSLAs in recent years. It does this with a unique
methodological approach, combining a quantitative cross–country study with qualitative
case studies based on data collected during in–depth field research in sub–Saharan Africa.
These are just the first steps in trying to understand this practice—which has extensive
economic, political and social repercussions. Further research, including what has just
been outlined and incorporating better data, will need to be undertaken in order to
address this so we can further enhance our understanding of LSLAs.
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1. GENERAL INFORMATION ON AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS 
1.1 Have you heard of any agricultural investments in your country/region? How many? Can 
you provide examples? 
1.2 Would you say your country/ region is an important target of agricultural investments? 
1.3 Who does account for the majority of agricultural investments (domestic/ foreign; 
public/private)? Does it make a difference who the investor is (private/state, regional/non-
regional, origin (China, Arab countries)? 
1.4 Since when are foreign investors interested in agriculture in your country/ region? Are 
there certain triggers? 
1.5 Does the government encourage investors to come to Kenya/this region? Has it always 
been this way, or were there any recent changes in the government’s attitude towards 
investors?  
 
2. CONTEXT CONDITIONS: LAND, FARMERS, LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1 Does the national law contain any relevant provision applicable to land deals, such as 
environmental or social/labour standards, obligation of investors to reimburse the local 
community in case of displacement? 
2.2 What are relevant laws with regard to foreign investments and land, labour and 
environmental laws, bilateral investment treaties, general investment regulations (i.e. 
registration etc.), rules for compensation, land acts?  
2.3 How did the referendum of 2010 affect agricultural investments by foreigners?  
2.4 Have there been disputes about land reforms in the last decade? What were the main 
conflicting parties/positions? Have they been resolved with the referendum?  
2.5 How far along is the land legislation according to constitutional obligations? 
2.6 How are customary and traditional land rights respected, and have there been any conflicts 
between these rights of local people and investor’s rights? Are customary laws recognized 
in the constitution? 
2.7 Is there a land registry office? How is it organized? (Do you have one in your region?)  
Appendix
Questionnaire1
1This is an example of a questionnaire I used. This one was used in Kenya. In the other countries,
I used a similar questionnaire but adapted it to the local context. Please note, that this is only a
guideline. Depending on the expertise and patience of interviewees, I would leave out certain questions.
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2.8 Do you know of conflicts, cases of fraud in land titles or other disputes? How does it 
incorporate customary law and traditional non-formal land rights? How big is the 
percentage of land cases in court? How much time does it require to resolve a land dispute 
in court? 
2.9 Who owns most of the land (the government, private owners, communities)?  
2.10 Is it easy to obtain land? Who can sell land? How do you get a land title or a lease? How 
secure is tenure? 
2.11 Is there a lot of idle arable land in Kenya/ your area? 
2.12 What type of land is targeted by investors (public, community, private)? 
2.13 How big is the percentage of land acquired by foreign and domestic investors? 
2.14 Do you have information on land prices and land price changes in the last decade? 
2.15 How is land farmed in Kenya/ this region (e.g. smallholder, commercial, region-specific 
crops, average farm-size)? Is there untapped potential in the agricultural sector?  
2.16 Which crops are mainly grown (by investors/ by smallholders)? Will they be used as food or 
biomass/biofuel, feedstock? 
2.17 Where are the agricultural products processed? Where are they sold (domestic, export, 
both (what percentage))? 
2.18 What are the biggest problems of farmers in Kenya/ this region (e.g. lack of land, lack of 
water, poor market access, no fertilizer, improved seeds)? How can these problems be 
addressed? 
2.19 Are you aware of land disputes between investors and the local population? If yes, which 
measurements are undertaken to solve this conflict? Who is acting? 
 
3. NEGOTIATION PHASE 
3.1 If an investor wants to acquire land in Kenya/this region, which steps does he have to 
follow? 
3.1.1.1 On public Land 
3.1.1.2 On Community Land 
3.1.1.3 On Private Land 
3.2 Which Kenyan authorities are involved in the process?  
3.3 What is the role of chiefs/ traditional authorities? 
3.4 Who is involved in the negotiation process (e.g. investor, central/district/local government, 
which ministries, chief, civil society)? Who decides?  
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3.5 Who knows of land acquisition before an official contract is signed, is it publicly 
announced? How is the local population informed? Is there time for discussion? How do 
local people react? 
3.6 Is there an official investment treaty between foreign governments and Kenya that governs 
such investment activities? 
3.7 Does the government give any incentives to investors, such as reduced taxes, 
infrastructure? 
3.8 Do contracts involve any obligations on the investor’s side, such as compensatory 
payments, infrastructure/social investment, environmental/social impact assessments? 
3.9 Do investors actually conduct an Environmental Management Plan/Agreement? Social 
Impact Assessment? If yes, who initiates it? Are EMP’s regulary conducted? 
3.10 Do investors purchase or lease land (purchase, lease from an official agency, lease from 
local land-user, no land transfer)? What is the time frame of leases?  
3.11 Who do investors pay (government, former owner, chief)? How do they pay – monthly, 
annually, for how long (annual ground rent, royalties)? Do investors usually hold an official 
land title?  
3.12 What water rights are allocated to investors? (extraction of ground water, surface water)  
3.13 Does the government have the capacity to monitor or enforce provisions of the contract? 
3.14 Does the government try to monitor or enforce provisions of the contract? 
3.15 How do you perceive corruption in conjunction with land deals and investments? 
3.16 Do you think that agricultural investments have a positive or negative influence on your 








Welcome address (thank you for coming, asking for participation, introduction of the team 
etc.).  
We work for the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), a research institute in 
Germany which is supported by the University of Nairobi for this project. All information 
provided is strictly for academic purposes and will be used in a research project. 
Before we start, let me explain the procedure: We would very much like to record the 
discussion. This will help us to remember its content and make sure that we do not miss 
any of the issues you have mentioned and the ideas you share with us. Details of the 
discussion and your names will be kept strictly confidential – so please feel free to express 
your opinions. I ask you to speak loudly and that only one person speaks at a time. Please 
respect the others’ opinions.  
 
2. Introduction round 
As a first step, we should introduce ourselves. Please tell us your name, what you do, and 
how long you have been living in this area (this is very important!). My colleague will 
prepare nametags to help us remember your names.  
 
3. Wellbeing in the Community 
Now, we would like to know how wellbeing in the community developed within the last 30 
years.  
 
We would kindly ask you to discuss how wellbeing in your community has developed 
during the last 30 years. My colleague is going to draw a line which shows the development 
of wellbeing. You should mention how the overall wellbeing of your community was at a 
certain time, and how it changed. Please start with the past (mention important points of 
reference, e.g. when Kibaki became president, so that all refer to the same time) and slowly 
work your way through to today’s time. We would highly appreciate if all of you 
participate. Please tell us your opinion. If you disagree with anything what is said by a 
fellow community member, do let us know and explain why you do so. Please mention 
important events which influenced wellbeing and let us know in which way these events 
influenced your community (positive or negative). Events could be anything which affected 
the lives of the people living in this area, e.g. a drought, an increase in prices, political 
events, aid programs etc. 
(Please take enough time to explain this and make sure that people understand what you 
ask them to do. 
Please do NOT mention Dominion Farms. At this stage, we do not want people to know that 







Guideline for focus group discussions2
2This is an example of a guideline used during focus group discussions for groups of farmers (with
instructions for the moderator in italics). For groups of employees, my research team and I used a
slightly different version. This guideline was used in Kenya. In the other countries, we used a similar

















            








Thank you for this insight into wellbeing of your community. The following discussion will 










































4. Negotiation Process 
Question Probe Question Key Topics of Interest 
• What were you 
doing before the 
farm started 
operating? 
• Where you living here 
before? 
• What did you do for living? / 
Did you do farming?  
• Did you own land? (Do you 
still own land?) 
• Did anything change? 
Situation before investors 
came – changes due to the 
investor? 
• How did you first 
learn about the 
investment? 
• Who informed you about the 
investment? 
• Do you know the investor 
personally? 
• Did you talk to him/ meet 
him before the investment? 
• What did you think about the 
investment in the first place? 
• What were you told about 
the investment? Did things 
develop the way you were 
told? 
• How did the investors 
communicate with you 
(when they first 
came/today)? 
Involvement of population in 
the negotiation process. 
Information of the local 
population. 
• What were the 
immediate 
implications of the 
investment? 
• Did you or anyone you know 
lose land?  
• What kind of land (farm land, 
community land…)? 
• What did these people do? 
• Were you/they 
compensated? 





• What is the most 
important effect of 
the investor on your 
community today? 
• What is positive? 
• What is negative? 
 








5. Investor’s influence on the community 
How does the investor’s presence affect life in the community today? 
 
Use pen and paper and make people fill out the following chart in discussion (moderator 
asks people to agree on a number and then fills it out): 
The assessment is based on the following criteria: 0= no influence; 1= low influence; 2= 




 Influence of Investment on…. 
General Quality of Life 
• Family Income  
• Agricultural Output  
• Health  
• Employment Situation  
Access to Resources 
• Agricultural Land  
• Water (for agric. Use)  
• Markets  
• Transport  
• Food/ Prices of food  






• Use of Technology 
(e.g. machinery) 
 
• Schooling  
Risks 
• Conflicts over land  
• Displacements  
 
6. Closure 
Before we close I would like to ask everybody to give a final statement on what he/she 











Please, make sure you include every small note, reaction or little sentences which are thrown in 
by any of the participants of the focus group discussions.  
If there are special ways of saying something in Luo/Kisuaheli (including proverbs or sayings), 
please write them down in English in the exact way they are spoken and give an explanation in 
brackets in the following way: (expl.: explanation on how to understand the respective sentence/word) 
If there are any questions, please mail to: kerstin.nolte@giga-hamburg.de . If necessary, I will also 
be able to call you and talk about questions / difficulties on the phone. 
 
<hm, text> = start and end of an overlap, which means that two or    
more participants speak at the same time.  
<I want to mention…  = direct continuation of speaking, but speaker changes 
Yes-yes = fast continuation of speaking, words are very close 
together/ doubling of words 
(3) = break, duration in seconds 
(.) = short stop in talk, short break  
Yeees = word is lengthened, the more vowels are used, the more 
the spoken word was stretched 
No = emphasize 
No = volume 
; = decreasing intonation 
? = increasing intonation 
Clear- = quit, drop 
(whatever) = insecurity in transcription, e.g. because speaker is not 
clearly understood 
(    )  = speech is not understood, blurred. The length of the 
bracket reflects the duration of the unclear talking 
[clears throat] = comments on para-verbal, non-verbal or external events 
(outside discussion) 
… = left out passages in transcript 
@text@ = text is spoken while laughing 
@(.)@ = short laughter 
@(3)@ = 3 seconds of laughter 













MR: Hm (.) now, let us begin the discussion (.) I would first like to ask you how you and other 1 
people learn about the investment by the Chinese. 2 
(4) 3 
Am: yes (.) I want to talk about the farm, when they first told us about it, hm, I thought it would 4 
be a good thing. I would get a job and also my wife. But now, (4) I have to say some people are 5 
not so happy about it. 6 
Bm:  <mh, yes this is what everyone thinks [nods with his head]> 7 
Am: but now it turns out they don’t pay us the wages (.) I don’t know where they are putting our 8 
money but we cannot pay the money for our children to go to school. But we work hard. 9 
Cm:   <yes, they are cheating us poor people we work but they don’t pay > 10 
Am: maybe we will never get our money.   11 
 [insecure laughter and making a zsch-sound with his mouth] 12 
 13 
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